Cronos vulnerable to DoS through unintended Contract Selfdestruct

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

8.2 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H

EPSS

No dated EPSS signal available.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

In Cronos nodes running versions before v0.7.0, the contract selfdestruct invocation permanently removes the corresponding bytecode from the internal database storage. However, due to a bug in Ethermint, all contracts that used the identical bytecode (i.e shared the same CodeHash) will also stop working once one contract invokes selfdestruct, even though the other contracts did not invoke the selfdestruct OPCODE. Thanks to the successfully coordinated security vulnerability disclosure, no smart contracts were impacted through the use of this vulnerability. Smart contract states and storage values are not affected by this vulnerability. This problem has been patched in Cronos v0.8.0. The patch has state machine-breaking changes and the required coordinated network upgrade was done on the block height 3982500 on the Cronos mainnet beta network. If a contract is subject to DoS due to this issue, the user can redeploy the same contract, i.e with identical bytecode, so that the original…

Published by the source

11 Aug 2022, 18:08 UTC

Last modified by the source

5 Apr 2023, 19:33 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 14:58 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-gwj5-wp6r-5q9f

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# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-gwj5-wp6r-5q9f

Advisory: Cronos vulnerable to DoS through unintended Contract Selfdestruct
IDs: GHSA-gwj5-wp6r-5q9f
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-gwj5-wp6r-5q9f (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 14:58 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 8.2)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/crypto-org-chain/cronos 0.8.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Go github.com/crypto-org-chain/cronos: affected <= 0.7.0; fixed in 0.8.0

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Go github.com/crypto-org-chain/cronos: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on github.com/crypto-org-chain/cronos.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-gwj5-wp6r-5q9f (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-gwj5-wp6r-5q9f lists affected ranges: Go github.com/crypto-org-chain/cronos >=0 <=0.7.0)

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