Incorrect validation of parties IDs leaks secret keys in Secret-sharing scheme

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

not scored

EPSS

No dated EPSS signal available.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary In the threshold signature scheme, participants start by dividing secrets into shares using a secret sharing scheme. The Verifiable Secret Sharing scheme generates shares from the user’s IDs but does not properly validate them. Using a malicious ID will make other users reveal their secrets during the secret-sharing procedure. In addition, a second issue resulting from lack of validation could cause nodes to crash when sent maliciously formed user IDs. Details The creation of Parties IDs does not properly validate for maliciously chosen IDs. Parties generate the secret shares in binance-chain/tss-lib codebase that keep-network/keep-ecdsa uses by evaluating the polynomial with the other parties’ IDs. It is critical that these party ids are non-zero because evaluating the polynomial at point 0 reveals the secret. There is a check that these ids are not zero, but this is insufficient since it is not performed modulo the curve order. Therefore, one can set their ID equal to the…

Published by the source

6 Jan 2022, 18:30 UTC

Last modified by the source

11 Jan 2023, 05:02 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 14:54 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-gp6j-vx54-5pmf

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# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-gp6j-vx54-5pmf

Advisory: Incorrect validation of parties IDs leaks secret keys in Secret-sharing scheme
IDs: GHSA-gp6j-vx54-5pmf
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-gp6j-vx54-5pmf (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 14:54 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Unrated
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/keep-network/keep-ecdsa 1.8.1. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Go github.com/keep-network/keep-ecdsa: affected < 1.8.1; fixed in 1.8.1

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Go github.com/keep-network/keep-ecdsa: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on github.com/keep-network/keep-ecdsa.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-gp6j-vx54-5pmf (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-gp6j-vx54-5pmf lists affected ranges: Go github.com/keep-network/keep-ecdsa >=0 <1.8.1)

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