accounts: Hash account number using Salt
What to do
Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (github.com/moov-io/customers 0.5.0), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
Go github.com/moov-io/customers
- Affected
- < 0.5.0
- Fixed in
- 0.5.0
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-g636-q5fc-4pr7 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/moov-io/customers >=0 <0.5.0
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- not scored
- EPSS
- No dated EPSS signal available.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
@alovak found that currently when we build hash of account number we do not "salt" it. Which makes it vulnerable to rainbow table attack. What did you expect to see? I expected salt (some random number from configuration) to be used in hash.AccountNumber I would generate salt per tenant at least (maybe per organization).
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-g636-q5fc-4pr7
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-g636-q5fc-4pr7 Advisory: accounts: Hash account number using Salt IDs: GHSA-g636-q5fc-4pr7 Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-g636-q5fc-4pr7 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 14:54 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: Unrated Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/moov-io/customers 0.5.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - Go github.com/moov-io/customers: affected < 0.5.0; fixed in 0.5.0 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - Go github.com/moov-io/customers: check the installed version with your package manager. ## Supported action Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on github.com/moov-io/customers. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g636-q5fc-4pr7 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-g636-q5fc-4pr7 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/moov-io/customers >=0 <0.5.0) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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