OpenClaw log poisoning (indirect prompt injection) via WebSocket headers

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

3.1 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

EPSS

No dated EPSS signal available.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary In openclaw versions prior to 2026.2.13, OpenClaw logged certain WebSocket request headers (including Origin and User-Agent) without neutralization or length limits on the "closed before connect" path. If an unauthenticated client can reach the gateway and send crafted header values, those values may be written into core logs. Under workflows where logs are later read or interpreted by an LLM (for example via AI-assisted debugging), this can increase the risk of indirect prompt injection (log poisoning). Affected Packages / Versions - Package: openclaw (npm) - Affected: <= 2026.2.12 - Fixed: = 2026.2.13 Details - Component: src/gateway/server/ws-connection.ts - Trigger: WebSocket connection closes before completing the connect/handshake; header values are included in the log message and structured context. Impact This issue is primarily an indirect prompt injection risk and depends on downstream log consumption behavior. If you do not feed logs into an LLM or other…

Published by the source

17 Feb 2026, 21:31 UTC

Last modified by the source

17 Feb 2026, 22:13 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 12:42 UTC

1. Revision 2 · amended · 26 Oct 2026

   Amended from ghsa record GHSA-g27f-9qjv-22pm

2. Revision 1 · created · 24 Oct 2026

   Published from osv record GHSA-g27f-9qjv-22pm

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# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-g27f-9qjv-22pm

Advisory: OpenClaw log poisoning (indirect prompt injection) via WebSocket headers
IDs: GHSA-g27f-9qjv-22pm
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-g27f-9qjv-22pm (revision 2, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 12:42 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Low (CVSS 3.1)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: openclaw 2026.2.13. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- npm openclaw: affected < 2026.2.13; fixed in 2026.2.13

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `npm ls openclaw --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on openclaw.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-g27f-9qjv-22pm (OSV record GHSA-g27f-9qjv-22pm lists affected ranges: npm openclaw >=0 <2026.2.13 (fixed))
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g27f-9qjv-22pm (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-g27f-9qjv-22pm lists affected ranges: npm openclaw >=0 <2026.2.13)

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