http4k: ServerFilters.DigestAuth / DigestAuthProvider defaulted to an always-true nonce verifier, disabling replay protection in default deployments

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

not scored

EPSS

No dated EPSS signal available.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Impact ServerFilters.DigestAuth and the underlying DigestAuthProvider both defaulted their nonceVerifier parameter to { true } — i.e. every nonce was accepted regardless of value, age, or prior use. Any deployment using the default configuration had no replay protection on Digest authentication; a captured Authorization: Digest … response could be replayed indefinitely against the same protected resource. The nonce-verification mechanism in Digest auth is the primary anti-replay control — without it, Digest reduces to a credential bound only to a stale nonce string. Who is affected: any application using ServerFilters.DigestAuth or DigestAuthProvider with the default nonceVerifier. The broken default has been present since DigestAuthProvider was introduced (2021). Exploitation requires the attacker to first capture a valid Digest response (network observation, log access, etc.) — non-trivial in modern TLS deployments but not impossible. Anyone running Digest auth with default config…

Published by the source

19 Jun 2026, 21:16 UTC

Last modified by the source

19 Jun 2026, 21:16 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 16:53 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-c7jm-38gq-h67h

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# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-c7jm-38gq-h67h

Advisory: http4k: `ServerFilters.DigestAuth` / `DigestAuthProvider` defaulted to an always-true nonce verifier, disabling replay protection in default deployments
IDs: GHSA-c7jm-38gq-h67h
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-c7jm-38gq-h67h (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 16:53 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Unrated
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: org.http4k:http4k-security-digest 6.48.0.0, 5.42.0.0, 4.51.0.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Maven org.http4k:http4k-security-digest: affected >= 6.0.0.0, < 6.48.0.0; >= 5.0.0.0, < 5.42.0.0; < 4.51.0.0; fixed in 6.48.0.0, 5.42.0.0, 4.51.0.0

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Maven org.http4k:http4k-security-digest: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on org.http4k:http4k-security-digest.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-c7jm-38gq-h67h (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-c7jm-38gq-h67h lists affected ranges: Maven org.http4k:http4k-security-digest >=6.0.0.0 =5.0.0.0 =0 <4.51.0.0)

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