githubtoplanguages: Command Injection via Issue Title in Discord Notification Workflow

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS 4.0

7.1 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N · score source

EPSS

No dated EPSS signal available.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary A GitHub Actions workflow is vulnerable to command injection through the issue title. The workflow is triggered when an issue is opened or closed, and it directly inserts github.event.issue.title into a Bash variable assignment. If an issue title contains command substitution syntax, Bash evaluates it during the workflow run. Details The vulnerable workflow is: .github/workflows/discord-issue.yml The issue title is directly interpolated into a Bash script: Because GitHub Actions expressions are expanded before Bash executes the script, an attacker-controlled issue title containing command substitution syntax can be evaluated by the shell. In the original workflow, the resulting value is then included in a Discord notification payload: PoC For safety, I reproduced this only in my fork. I did not trigger the original repository’s Discord webhook. I kept the vulnerable Bash assignment unchanged and replaced the Discord webhook request with echo statements to observe the result…

Published by the source

19 Jun 2026, 22:10 UTC

Last modified by the source

19 Jun 2026, 22:10 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 17:08 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-c3xh-98xp-6qhf

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# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-c3xh-98xp-6qhf

Advisory: githubtoplanguages: Command Injection via Issue Title in Discord Notification Workflow
IDs: GHSA-c3xh-98xp-6qhf
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-c3xh-98xp-6qhf (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 17:08 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 7.1)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: gouef/githubtoplanguages 1.1.4. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- GitHub Actions gouef/githubtoplanguages: affected < 1.1.4; fixed in 1.1.4

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- GitHub Actions gouef/githubtoplanguages: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on gouef/githubtoplanguages.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-c3xh-98xp-6qhf (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-c3xh-98xp-6qhf lists affected ranges: GitHub Actions gouef/githubtoplanguages >=0 <1.1.4)

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