Zendframework potential security issue in login mechanism

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

7.5 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

EPSS

No dated EPSS signal available.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Using the Consumer component of ZendOpenId (or ZendOpenId in ZF1), it is possible to login using an arbitrary OpenID account (without knowing any secret information) by using a malicious OpenID Provider. That means OpenID it is possible to login using arbitrary OpenID Identity (MyOpenID, Google, etc), which are not under the control of our own OpenID Provider. Thus, we are able to impersonate any OpenID Identity against the framework. Moreover, the Consumer accepts OpenID tokens with arbitrary signed elements. The framework does not check if, for example, both openid.claimedid and openid.endpointurl are signed. It is just sufficient to sign one parameter. According to https://openid.net/specs/openid-authentication-20.html#positiveassertions, at least opendpoint, returnto, responsenonce, assochandle, and, if present in the response, claimedid and identity, must be signed.

Published by the source

7 Jun 2024, 22:24 UTC

Last modified by the source

7 Jun 2024, 22:24 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 14:25 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-9v78-h226-2rmq

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# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-9v78-h226-2rmq

Advisory: Zendframework potential security issue in login mechanism
IDs: GHSA-9v78-h226-2rmq
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-9v78-h226-2rmq (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 14:25 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 7.5)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: zendframework/zendframework1 1.12.4. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Packagist zendframework/zendframework1: affected >= 1.12.0, < 1.12.4; fixed in 1.12.4

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Packagist zendframework/zendframework1: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on zendframework/zendframework1.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9v78-h226-2rmq (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-9v78-h226-2rmq lists affected ranges: Packagist zendframework/zendframework1 >=1.12.0 <1.12.4)

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