utcp-http has an OAuth2 tokenUrl Trust Boundary Bypass in OpenAPI Conversion

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

7.1 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N

EPSS

No dated EPSS signal available.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary The utcp-http library (<= 1.1.3) unconditionally trusts the tokenUrl field embedded in remote OpenAPI security schemes. When a victim registers an attacker-controlled OpenAPI spec and invokes any generated OAuth2-protected tool, the library POSTs the victim's clientid and clientsecret to the attacker-supplied token endpoint without any URL validation. The same ensuresecureurl() guard applied to discovery URLs and tool invocation URLs is absent for the OAuth2 token endpoint, creating a credential-exfiltration path. Details utcp-http supports automatic tool generation from remote OpenAPI specifications. During conversion, OpenApiConverter.extractauth() reads OAuth2 flow configuration directly from the spec: The generated HttpCallTemplate carries this OAuth2Auth object. At call time, HttpCommunicationProtocol.handleoauth2() forwards credentials to that URL: By contrast, the discovery URL and the tool invocation URL are both validated before use: The ensuresecureurl() function…

Published by the source

25 Aug 2026, 15:57 UTC

Last modified by the source

25 Aug 2026, 15:57 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 13:50 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-8cp3-qxj6-px34

Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.

# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-8cp3-qxj6-px34

Advisory: utcp-http has an OAuth2 `tokenUrl` Trust Boundary Bypass in OpenAPI Conversion
IDs: GHSA-8cp3-qxj6-px34
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-8cp3-qxj6-px34 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 13:50 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 7.1)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: utcp-http 1.1.4. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- PyPI utcp-http: affected <= 1.1.3; fixed in 1.1.4

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `python -m pip show utcp-http`: prints the installed version. Run with the environment that serves production active.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on utcp-http.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8cp3-qxj6-px34 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-8cp3-qxj6-px34 lists affected ranges: PyPI utcp-http >=0 <=1.1.3)

Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.