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High, CVSS 8.1

SyncChannel can move 'T: !Send' to other threads

GHSA-8892-84wf-cg8f

What to do

Vendor response not established. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check back for a fix.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

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Affected packages

  • crates.io signal-simple

    Affected
    <= 0.1.1
    Fixed in
    no fixed version recorded

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS
8.1 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
EPSS
No dated EPSS signal available.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Affected versions of this crate unconditionally implement Send/Sync for SyncChannel<T. SyncChannel<T doesn't provide access to &T but merely serves as a channel that consumes and returns owned T. Users can create UB in safe Rust by sending T: !Send to other threads with SyncChannel::send/recv APIs. Using T = Arc<Cell< allows to create data races (which can lead to memory corruption), and using T = MutexGuard<T allows to unlock a mutex from a thread that didn't lock the mutex.

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from ghsa record GHSA-8892-84wf-cg8f

Agent brief

Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.

# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-8892-84wf-cg8f

Advisory: SyncChannel can move 'T: !Send' to other threads
IDs: GHSA-8892-84wf-cg8f
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-8892-84wf-cg8f (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:34 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 8.1)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor response not established. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- crates.io signal-simple: affected <= 0.1.1

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- crates.io signal-simple: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on signal-simple.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8892-84wf-cg8f (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-8892-84wf-cg8f lists affected ranges: crates.io signal-simple >=0 <=0.1.1)

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