Ouroboros is Unsound

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

not scored

EPSS

No dated EPSS signal available.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

In 0.15.0 and prior, Ouroboros works internally by creating a struct where all uses of 'this are replaced by 'static. However, a recent addition to Miri checks that references passed to functions are valid during the entire execution of the function, even when those references are passed inside a struct. This poses an issue for dropping self-referencing values, as the reference becomes invalid during the dropping process. Effectively, since self-referencing structs are not allowed in vanilla Rust, there is no allowance for dropping data during a function that has also been given a reference to that data. There's usually no way to pass a and &a to the same function. A fix was attempted, where the struct would be turned in to a raw byte array and only transformed back into the underlying data type inside each function. This is allowable as a reference can be created and die over the body of a function, as long as the reference was created inside the function. However, this is also not…

Published by the source

12 Jun 2023, 18:52 UTC

Last modified by the source

16 Jun 2023, 17:45 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 15:37 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-87mf-9wg6-ppf8

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# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-87mf-9wg6-ppf8

Advisory: Ouroboros is Unsound
IDs: GHSA-87mf-9wg6-ppf8
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-87mf-9wg6-ppf8 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:37 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Unrated
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: ouroboros 0.16.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- crates.io ouroboros: affected < 0.16.0; fixed in 0.16.0

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- crates.io ouroboros: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on ouroboros.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-87mf-9wg6-ppf8 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-87mf-9wg6-ppf8 lists affected ranges: crates.io ouroboros >=0 <0.16.0)

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