Unauthenticated Open Redirect, Arbitrary HTTP Response Header Injection, Missing CSRF, and Invisible-Mode Bypass in goshs /?redirect endpoint

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

not scored

EPSS

No dated EPSS signal available.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary The GET /?redirect endpoint in goshs v2.0.0-beta.6 performs an HTTP redirect to any attacker-supplied url= value and writes any attacker-supplied header=Name: Value pair into the response, without scheme/host validation, without a header-name allow-list, without authentication in the default deployment, and without the checkCSRF() guard that GHSA-jrq5-hg6x-j6g3 added to the other state-changing GET routes (?mkdir, ?delete). The same dispatcher also lacks an fs.Invisible branch, so the endpoint stays responsive in -I stealth mode and reliably fingerprints an "invisible" goshs deployment with a single request. Details httpserver/handler.go:222-228 — the dispatcher gates ?redirect only with denyForTokenAccess (which only blocks share-token callers). It does not check fs.Invisible and does not call checkCSRF: httpserver/handler.go:753-787 — handleRedirect: httpserver/server.go:85-100 — BasicAuthMiddleware is registered only when fs.User != "" || fs.Pass != ""; the default goshs…

Published by the source

14 Apr 2026, 22:53 UTC

Last modified by the source

14 Apr 2026, 22:53 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 15:19 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-7qx6-f23w-3w7f

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# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-7qx6-f23w-3w7f

Advisory: Unauthenticated Open Redirect, Arbitrary HTTP Response Header Injection, Missing CSRF, and Invisible-Mode Bypass in goshs `/?redirect` endpoint
IDs: GHSA-7qx6-f23w-3w7f
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-7qx6-f23w-3w7f (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:19 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Unrated
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor response not established. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Go github.com/patrickhener/goshs/v2: affected <= 2.0.0-beta.6
- Go github.com/patrickhener/goshs: affected <= 1.1.4

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Go github.com/patrickhener/goshs/v2: check the installed version with your package manager.
- Go github.com/patrickhener/goshs: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on github.com/patrickhener/goshs/v2, github.com/patrickhener/goshs.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7qx6-f23w-3w7f (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-7qx6-f23w-3w7f lists affected ranges: Go github.com/patrickhener/goshs >=0 =0 <=2.0.0-beta.6)

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