Plonk verifier KZG multi point verification

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

not scored

EPSS

No dated EPSS signal available.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Impact The vulnerability allows a third party to derive a valid proof from a valid initial tuple {proof, publicinputs}, corresponding to the same public inputs as the initial proof. It is due to a randomness being generated using a small part of the scratch memory describing the state, allowing for degrees of freedom in the transcript. Note that the impact is limited to the PlonK verifier smart contract. Patches We still use a hash function on some data to have a pseudo rng, but instead of hashing the first 32 bytes of the state ( let random := mod(keccak256(state, 0x20), rmod) ) we hash the whole state at this point of the verifier as if it was a Fiat Shamir transcript: Workarounds In the function batchverifymultipoints, the variable random (corresponding to u in the paper, step 12 of the plonk verification process) should depend on statefoldeddigestsx, statefoldeddigestsy, proofgrandproductcommitmentx, proofgrandproductcommitmenty and statezeta (by hashing those values for instance).

Published by the source

17 Oct 2023, 14:24 UTC

Last modified by the source

26 Jan 2024, 16:17 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 15:03 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-7p92-x423-vwj6

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# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-7p92-x423-vwj6

Advisory: Plonk verifier KZG multi point verification
IDs: GHSA-7p92-x423-vwj6
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-7p92-x423-vwj6 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:03 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Unrated
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/consensys/gnark 0.9.1. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Go github.com/consensys/gnark: affected < 0.9.1; fixed in 0.9.1

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Go github.com/consensys/gnark: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on github.com/consensys/gnark.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7p92-x423-vwj6 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-7p92-x423-vwj6 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/consensys/gnark >=0 <0.9.1)

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