LXD has project restriction bypass for custom volume copy across projects

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

7.7 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

EPSS

No dated EPSS signal available.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Reported from https://github.com/lxc/incus/security/advisories/GHSA-64f3-v33m-w89f

Summary Missing authorization checks exist for custom volume copying where an attacker knowing the name of a project that they don't have access to and the name of a custom volume in that project can copy the custom volume to a new project. This issue could allow an attacker to access secrets in custom volumes they are not authorized to access.

Details The storage volume creation handler authorizes creation in the target project, then passes `req.Source.Project` into the custom-volume copy path without checking that the caller can view the source volume. `req.Source.Project` is the attacker-controlled field. It is resolved to a storage volume project name and passed directly to `CreateCustomVolumeFromCopy`. No `allowPermission` or entitlement check (e.g. `CanView` on the source volume) is performed. From my understanding, the copy must occur on the same server. However, once the copy has been…

Published by the source

6 Nov 2026, 19:51 UTC

Last modified by the source

6 Nov 2026, 20:00 UTC

Source last checked

7 Nov 2026, 06:05 UTC

1. Revision 2 · amended · 7 Nov 2026

   Amended from osv record GHSA-7mr3-28h5-m5vx

2. Revision 1 · created · 6 Nov 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-7mr3-28h5-m5vx

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# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-7mr3-28h5-m5vx

Advisory: LXD has project restriction bypass for custom volume copy across projects
IDs: GHSA-7mr3-28h5-m5vx
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-7mr3-28h5-m5vx (revision 2, source checked 7 Nov 2026, 06:05 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 7.7)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/canonical/lxd 0.0.0-20260630083100-c5184be310b1. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Go github.com/canonical/lxd: affected < 0.0.0-20260630083100-c5184be310b1; fixed in 0.0.0-20260630083100-c5184be310b1

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Go github.com/canonical/lxd: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on github.com/canonical/lxd.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7mr3-28h5-m5vx (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-7mr3-28h5-m5vx lists affected ranges: Go github.com/canonical/lxd >=0 <0.0.0-20260630083100-c5184be310b1)
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-7mr3-28h5-m5vx (OSV record GHSA-7mr3-28h5-m5vx lists affected ranges: Go github.com/canonical/lxd >=0 <0.0.0-20260630083100-c5184be310b1 (fixed))

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