Babylon Finality Provider MsgCommitPubRandList replay attack

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS 4.0

8.9 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:H/SA:N · score source

EPSS

No dated EPSS signal available.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary A high vulnerability exists in the Babylon protocol's x/finality module due to a lack of domain separation in signed messages, combined with insufficient validation in the MsgCommitPubRandList handler. Specifically, the handler does not enforce that the submitted Commitment field is 32 bytes long. This allows an attacker to replay a signature originally generated for a different message (e.g., a Proof-of-Possession in MsgCreateFinalityProvider) as a MsgCommitPubRandList. By crafting the message parameters, an attacker can use the typically 20-byte address bytes (from the PoP context) to form the StartHeight, NumPubRand, and a shorter-than-expected Commitment (e.g., 4 bytes). The replayed signature will pass verification for this crafted message, leading to the injection of an invalid PubRand commitment. Impact Successful exploitation of this vulnerability, specifically via the PoP signature replay, allows an attacker to store an invalid PubRand commitment (with a non-standard…

Published by the source

15 May 2025, 14:05 UTC

Last modified by the source

31 Jul 2025, 16:43 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 15:09 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-7mm3-vfg8-7rg6

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# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-7mm3-vfg8-7rg6

Advisory: Babylon Finality Provider `MsgCommitPubRandList` replay attack
IDs: GHSA-7mm3-vfg8-7rg6
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-7mm3-vfg8-7rg6 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:09 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 8.9)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/babylonlabs-io/babylon 1.1.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Go github.com/babylonlabs-io/babylon: affected < 1.1.0; fixed in 1.1.0

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Go github.com/babylonlabs-io/babylon: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on github.com/babylonlabs-io/babylon.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7mm3-vfg8-7rg6 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-7mm3-vfg8-7rg6 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/babylonlabs-io/babylon >=0 <1.1.0)

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