Fission: MessageQueueTrigger scaler manager materializes Secret values into Deployment envvars and accepts arbitrary user PodSpec

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

8.1 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

EPSS

No dated EPSS signal available.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary The Fission MessageQueueTrigger (MQT) scaler controller exposed two privilege-escalation primitives to any subject able to create MQTs in a namespace. Details 1. Secret materialization. getEnvVarlist in pkg/mqtrigger/scalermanager.go read the Secret named in Spec.Secret using the controller's cluster-wide secrets/get RBAC and emitted each key as a literal EnvVar.Value, copying the plaintext secret content into the connector Deployment's pod template. A subject holding messagequeuetriggers/create but not secrets/get could exfiltrate any Secret in the namespace by pointing an MQT at it. 2. PodSpec injection. Spec.PodSpec was merged into the controller-built connector PodSpec via util.MergePodSpec with no allowlist on which fields could come from the user. An MQT could substitute Containers[].Image (run any image), override Command/Args, inject Env, add VolumeMounts + Volumes, override ServiceAccountName, and set HostNetwork/HostPID/HostIPC — turning messagequeuetriggers/create…

Published by the source

30 Jun 2026, 18:12 UTC

Last modified by the source

30 Jun 2026, 18:12 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 15:24 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-7m8x-qg2j-4m3v

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# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-7m8x-qg2j-4m3v

Advisory: Fission: MessageQueueTrigger scaler manager materializes Secret values into Deployment envvars and accepts arbitrary user PodSpec
IDs: GHSA-7m8x-qg2j-4m3v
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-7m8x-qg2j-4m3v (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:24 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 8.1)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/fission/fission 1.24.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Go github.com/fission/fission: affected <= 1.23.0; fixed in 1.24.0

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Go github.com/fission/fission: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on github.com/fission/fission.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7m8x-qg2j-4m3v (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-7m8x-qg2j-4m3v lists affected ranges: Go github.com/fission/fission >=0 <=1.23.0)

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