phpMyFAQ's Missing Authorization on Tag Deletion Allows Any Authenticated User to Delete Tags

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

5.4 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L

EPSS

No dated EPSS signal available.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary The TagController::delete() endpoint at DELETE /admin/api/content/tags/{tagId} only verifies that the user is logged in (userIsAuthenticated()), but does not check any permission. Any authenticated user — including regular non-admin frontend users — can delete any tag by ID. This contrasts with TagController::update() and TagController::search(), which both enforce the FAQEDIT permission. Details In phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Administration/Api/TagController.php, the delete() method (line 121-133) uses only $this-userIsAuthenticated(): Compare with update() (line 48-71) which properly enforces authorization: The userIsAuthenticated() method in AbstractController (line 258-263) only checks $this-currentUser-isLoggedIn(): There is no admin-level middleware in the Kernel — it registers only RouterListener, LanguageListener, ControllerContainerListener, and exception listeners. The admin API entry point (admin/api/index.php) shares the same bootstrap and session as the…

Published by the source

6 May 2026, 20:12 UTC

Last modified by the source

6 May 2026, 20:12 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 14:40 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-7cx3-2qx2-3g6w

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# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-7cx3-2qx2-3g6w

Advisory: phpMyFAQ's Missing Authorization on Tag Deletion Allows Any Authenticated User to Delete Tags
IDs: GHSA-7cx3-2qx2-3g6w
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-7cx3-2qx2-3g6w (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 14:40 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 5.4)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq 4.1.2; thorsten/phpmyfaq 4.1.2. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Packagist phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq: affected <= 4.1.1; fixed in 4.1.2
- Packagist thorsten/phpmyfaq: affected <= 4.1.1; fixed in 4.1.2

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Packagist phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq: check the installed version with your package manager.
- Packagist thorsten/phpmyfaq: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq, thorsten/phpmyfaq.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7cx3-2qx2-3g6w (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-7cx3-2qx2-3g6w lists affected ranges: Packagist phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq >=0 =0 <=4.1.1)

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