Horcrux Double Sign Possibility

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS 4.0

8.7 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:A · score source

EPSS

No dated EPSS signal available.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Horcrux Incident Disclosure: Possible Double-Sign Summary On March 6, 2025, a Horcrux user (01node) experienced a double-signing incident on the Osmosis network, resulting in a 5% slash penalty (approximately 75,000 OSMO or $20,000 USD). After thorough investigation, we have identified a race condition in Horcrux's signature state handling as the root cause. This vulnerability was introduced in July 2023 as part of PR \#169 and affects all Horcrux versions from v3.1.0 through v3.3.1. A fix has been developed and is being deployed immediately. Probability The bug has an extremely low probability of occurrence, affecting one validator out of hundreds that have been using the affected software versions to validate over the past few years. In the added tests, the probability on typical hardware is in the range of 1 in 1 billion per signed vote due to the root cause needing two independent events to occur within approximately the same microsecond duration. Severity While rare, it is of…

Published by the source

7 Mar 2025, 20:00 UTC

Last modified by the source

7 Mar 2025, 20:00 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 15:09 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-6wxf-7784-62fp

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# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-6wxf-7784-62fp

Advisory: Horcrux Double Sign Possibility
IDs: GHSA-6wxf-7784-62fp
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-6wxf-7784-62fp (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:09 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 8.7)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/strangelove-ventures/horcrux/v3 3.3.2. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Go github.com/strangelove-ventures/horcrux/v3: affected >= 3.1.0, < 3.3.2; fixed in 3.3.2

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Go github.com/strangelove-ventures/horcrux/v3: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on github.com/strangelove-ventures/horcrux/v3.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6wxf-7784-62fp (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-6wxf-7784-62fp lists affected ranges: Go github.com/strangelove-ventures/horcrux/v3 >=3.1.0 <3.3.2)

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