PHP JWT Framework: Chacha20Poly1305 key-encryption algorithm discards the Poly1305 authentication tag, performing no authentication on decryption
What to do
Partial vendor fix. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check back for a fix.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
Packagist web-token/jwt-experimental
- Affected
- <= 4.1.6
- Fixed in
- no fixed version recorded
Packagist web-token/jwt-library
- Affected
- < 3.4.10>= 4.0.0, < 4.0.7>= 4.1.0, < 4.1.7
- Fixed in
- 4.0.7, 3.4.10, 4.1.7
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-6vvh-pxr4-25r7 lists affected ranges: Packagist web-token/jwt-experimental >=0 =0 =4.0.0 =4.1.0 <4.1.7
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS 4.0
- 6.0 · CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N · score source
- EPSS
- No dated EPSS signal available.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Impact The experimental Chacha20Poly1305 key-encryption algorithm generates the 16-byte Poly1305 authentication tag during encryptKey() but discards it: the tag is never written to the header and therefore never reaches the wire. On the receiving side, decryptKey() calls openssldecrypt('chacha20-poly1305', ...) without the tag argument, which makes OpenSSL skip authentication entirely. As a result the AEAD construction is silently degraded to unauthenticated ChaCha20: a tampered encrypted CEK is accepted, and because ChaCha20 is a stream cipher, a single-byte change in the ciphertext propagates as a single-byte change in the recovered CEK with no integrity check (CWE-353 / CWE-347). An attacker on the token path can manipulate the wrapped key without detection. Affected configurations Applications that register Jose\Experimental\KeyEncryption\Chacha20Poly1305 (package web-token/jwt-experimental) as a JWE alg. Patches encryptKey() now publishes the Poly1305 tag as the base64url tag…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-6vvh-pxr4-25r7
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-6vvh-pxr4-25r7 Advisory: PHP JWT Framework: Chacha20Poly1305 key-encryption algorithm discards the Poly1305 authentication tag, performing no authentication on decryption IDs: GHSA-6vvh-pxr4-25r7 Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-6vvh-pxr4-25r7 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 14:49 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: Medium (CVSS 6.0) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Partial vendor fix; fixed versions by package: web-token/jwt-library 4.1.7, 4.0.7, 3.4.10. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - Packagist web-token/jwt-experimental: affected <= 4.1.6 - Packagist web-token/jwt-library: affected < 3.4.10; >= 4.0.0, < 4.0.7; >= 4.1.0, < 4.1.7; fixed in 4.0.7, 3.4.10, 4.1.7 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - Packagist web-token/jwt-experimental: check the installed version with your package manager. - Packagist web-token/jwt-library: check the installed version with your package manager. ## Supported action No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on web-token/jwt-experimental, web-token/jwt-library. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6vvh-pxr4-25r7 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-6vvh-pxr4-25r7 lists affected ranges: Packagist web-token/jwt-experimental >=0 =0 =4.0.0 =4.1.0 <4.1.7) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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