actions-mkdocs: Command Injection via issue title in internal GitHub Actions workflow

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

6.5 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

EPSS

No dated EPSS signal available.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary External input from github.event.issue.title is used unsafely in a shell command in .github/workflows/release-candidate.yaml, allowing command injection during workflow execution. Details In .github/workflows/release-candidate.yaml, the issue title is interpolated directly into a shell command: Because the issue title is attacker-controlled and is embedded directly into a shell command, shell metacharacters such as command substitution ($()) and command separators (;) can be interpreted by the shell. Although the workflow checks that the title starts with Release , this condition can still be satisfied by a maliciously crafted input. PoC 1. Create or edit an issue with the following title: 2. Trigger the workflow that processes the issue. 3. Observe that the injected command is executed on the runner. The workflow logs show that $(whoami) is evaluated and its output (runner) appears in the command result, confirming that attacker-controlled input is executed within the shell.…

Published by the source

4 Apr 2026, 06:03 UTC

Last modified by the source

4 Apr 2026, 06:03 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 17:08 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-6p2j-742g-835f

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# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-6p2j-742g-835f

Advisory: actions-mkdocs: Command Injection via issue title in internal GitHub Actions workflow
IDs: GHSA-6p2j-742g-835f
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-6p2j-742g-835f (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 17:08 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 6.5)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: tiryoh/actions-mkdocs 0.25.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- GitHub Actions tiryoh/actions-mkdocs: affected <= 0.24.0; fixed in 0.25.0

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- GitHub Actions tiryoh/actions-mkdocs: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on tiryoh/actions-mkdocs.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6p2j-742g-835f (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-6p2j-742g-835f lists affected ranges: GitHub Actions tiryoh/actions-mkdocs >=0 <=0.24.0)

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