zeptoclaw has Shell allowlist-blocklist bypass via command/argument injection and file name wildcards

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

10.0 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

EPSS

No dated EPSS signal available.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary zeptoclaw implements a allowlist combined with a blocklist to prevent malicious shell commands in src/security/shell.rs. However, even in the Strict mode, attackers can completely bypass all the guards from allowlist and blocklist: - to bypass the allowlist, command injection is enough, such as ;, $() etc. - to bypass the REGEXBLOCKEDPATTERNS, argument injection is enough, such as the python3 -P -c "..." - to bypass the LITERALBLOCKEDPATTERNS, file name wildcards can do the work, such as cat /etc/pass[w]d Details In code src/security/shell.rs#L218-L243, one can see the allowlist only checks the first token and thus makes command injection possible. !self.allowlist.isempty() makes the empty allowlist overlook the allowlist check, if it is in ShellAllowlistMode::Strict mode, empty allowlist should direct reject all the commands. As the code in src/security/shell.rs#L18-L70, we can find the REGEXBLOCKEDPATTERNS only apply \s+ in between the command and arguments, making argument…

Published by the source

5 Mar 2026, 00:38 UTC

Last modified by the source

5 Mar 2026, 00:38 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 15:42 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-5wp8-q9mx-8jx8

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# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-5wp8-q9mx-8jx8

Advisory: zeptoclaw has Shell allowlist-blocklist bypass via command/argument injection and file name wildcards
IDs: GHSA-5wp8-q9mx-8jx8
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-5wp8-q9mx-8jx8 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:42 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Critical (CVSS 10.0)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: zeptoclaw 0.6.2. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- crates.io zeptoclaw: affected <= 0.6.1; fixed in 0.6.2

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- crates.io zeptoclaw: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on zeptoclaw.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5wp8-q9mx-8jx8 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-5wp8-q9mx-8jx8 lists affected ranges: crates.io zeptoclaw >=0 <=0.6.1)

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