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High, CVSS 8.8amended

SurrealDB: HTTP /rpc sessions method leaks attached session UUIDs, enabling full session hijack by anonymous callers

CVE-2026-63757GHSA-5qfp-32cf-69jh

What to do

Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (surrealdb 3.1.0), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

Affected packages

  • crates.io surrealdb

    Affected
    < 3.1.0
    Fixed in
    3.1.0

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS
8.8 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
EPSS
  • CVE-2026-63757: 0.54% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 45.24 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

The HTTP `/rpc` `sessions` method returned every attached session UUID without authentication, and the `/rpc` handler accepted an arbitrary `session` field with no ownership check. An anonymous caller could enumerate UUIDs and impersonate any authenticated session. "Attached" means sessions registered via `{"method":"attach"}` — the only writer to the HTTP session map. Ordinary stateless `/rpc` requests use ephemeral per-request sessions that are filtered from `sessions()` and destroyed at end-of-request, so they are not enumerable.

Exposure - Exposed: clients that issue `attach`, notably the official Rust SDK's `Http`/`Https` engine (auto-attaches once per `Surreal` handle). - Not exposed: REST endpoints (`/sql`, `/key`, `/signin`, `/export`, etc.); WebSocket `/rpc` (per-connection scope, `attach` refused); embedded / MCP usage; ad-hoc `POST /rpc` callers that never `attach`.

Impact For each attached and authenticated session, an unauthenticated attacker can…

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 2 · amended ·

    Amended from osv record GHSA-5qfp-32cf-69jh

  2. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from ghsa record GHSA-5qfp-32cf-69jh

Agent brief

Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.

# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-63757

Advisory: SurrealDB: HTTP /rpc `sessions` method leaks attached session UUIDs, enabling full session hijack by anonymous callers
IDs: CVE-2026-63757, GHSA-5qfp-32cf-69jh
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-5qfp-32cf-69jh (revision 2, source checked 4 Nov 2026, 06:30 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 8.8)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: surrealdb 3.1.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- crates.io surrealdb: affected < 3.1.0; fixed in 3.1.0

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- crates.io surrealdb: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on surrealdb.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5qfp-32cf-69jh (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-5qfp-32cf-69jh lists affected ranges: crates.io surrealdb >=0 <3.1.0)
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-5qfp-32cf-69jh (OSV record GHSA-5qfp-32cf-69jh lists affected ranges: crates.io surrealdb >=0 <3.1.0 (fixed))

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