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Medium, CVSS 6.3

stigmem-node has blind SSRF via unvalidated webhook subscription delivery_address

GHSA-5p3m-vhh6-9236

What to do

Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (stigmem-node 0.9.0a11), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

Affected packages

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS
6.3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
EPSS
No dated EPSS signal available.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary Stigmem allows an authenticated user to create a webhook subscription with a user-controlled deliveryaddress. That value is stored and later used directly by the subscription delivery worker as the destination of a server-side HTTP POST request. The codebase already contains an outbound SSRF guard, assertsafeurl(), which blocks loopback, private, link-local, and metadata-style destinations. However, the subscription webhook delivery path does not appear to apply this guard either when the subscription is created or immediately before delivery. As a result, an authenticated user can configure a webhook destination such as http://127.0.0.1:9999/ssrf, trigger a matching fact-change event, and cause the Stigmem server to issue a server-side HTTP request to an internal loopback address. Details Relevant files: text HIT: POST /ssrf user-agent: python-httpx/0.28.1 x-stigmem-event-id: ... Kindly check this out: EideticCVEReport.pdf

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from ghsa record GHSA-5p3m-vhh6-9236

Agent brief

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# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-5p3m-vhh6-9236

Advisory: stigmem-node has blind SSRF via unvalidated webhook subscription delivery_address
IDs: GHSA-5p3m-vhh6-9236
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-5p3m-vhh6-9236 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 13:50 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 6.3)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: stigmem-node 0.9.0a11. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- PyPI stigmem-node: affected < 0.9.0a11; fixed in 0.9.0a11

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `python -m pip show stigmem-node`: prints the installed version. Run with the environment that serves production active.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on stigmem-node.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5p3m-vhh6-9236 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-5p3m-vhh6-9236 lists affected ranges: PyPI stigmem-node >=0 <0.9.0a11)

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