Command Injection in moment-timezone

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

not scored

EPSS

No dated EPSS signal available.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Impact All versions of moment-timezone from 0.1.0 contain build tasks vulnerable to command injection. if Alice uses tzdata pipeline to package moment-timezone on her own (for example via grunt data:2014d, where 2014d stands for the version of the tzdata to be used from IANA's website), and Alice let's Mallory select the version (2014d in our example), then Mallory can execute arbitrary commands on the machine running the grunt task, with the same privilege as the grunt task Am I affected? Do you build custom versions of moment-timezone with grunt? If no, you're not affected. Do you allow a third party to specify which particular version you want build? If yes, you're vulnerable to command injection -- third party may execute arbitrary commands on the system running grunt task with the same privileges as grunt task. Description Command Injection via grunt-zdownload.js and MITM on iana's ftp endpoint The tasks/data-download.js script takes in a parameter from grunt and uses it to form…

Published by the source

30 Aug 2022, 20:31 UTC

Last modified by the source

12 Jan 2023, 05:07 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 12:16 UTC

1. Revision 2 · amended · 26 Oct 2026

   Amended from ghsa record GHSA-56x4-j7p9-fcf9

2. Revision 1 · created · 24 Oct 2026

   Published from osv record GHSA-56x4-j7p9-fcf9

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# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-56x4-j7p9-fcf9

Advisory: Command Injection in moment-timezone
IDs: GHSA-56x4-j7p9-fcf9
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-56x4-j7p9-fcf9 (revision 2, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 12:16 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Unrated
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: moment-timezone 0.5.35. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- npm moment-timezone: affected >= 0.1.0, < 0.5.35; fixed in 0.5.35

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `npm ls moment-timezone --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on moment-timezone.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-56x4-j7p9-fcf9 (OSV record GHSA-56x4-j7p9-fcf9 lists affected ranges: npm moment-timezone >=0.1.0 <0.5.35 (fixed))
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-56x4-j7p9-fcf9 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-56x4-j7p9-fcf9 lists affected ranges: npm moment-timezone >=0.1.0 <0.5.35)

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