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Low, CVSS 3.7

Kanidm has non-constant-time comparison of OAuth2 client_secret

GHSA-53hj-r94p-8c8f

What to do

Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (kanidm 1.9.3), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

Affected packages

  • crates.io kanidm

    Affected
    <= 1.9.2
    Fixed in
    1.9.3

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS
3.7 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
EPSS
No dated EPSS signal available.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary The kanidmd OAuth2 token-exchange (/oauth2/token) and token-introspection (/oauth2/token/introspect) endpoints compare the supplied clientsecret against the stored secret using Rust's PartialEq on String, which short-circuits on the first mismatching byte. This produces an observable timing discrepancy that varies with the length of the matching prefix. Details - https://github.com/kanidm/kanidm/blob/master/server/lib/src/idm/oauth2.rs#L1135 — variable-time comparison in checkoauth2tokenexchange - https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/208.html — CWE-208: Observable Timing Discrepancy PoC Static analysis only — no timing-recovery script was run because remote recovery of a 48-byte high-entropy secret over HTTPS is not practically demonstrable. The variable-time behaviour is established by inspection: String: PartialEq delegates to <[u8] as PartialEq::eq, which checks length equality then iterates byte-by-byte and returns on the first difference. Impact An unauthenticated…

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from ghsa record GHSA-53hj-r94p-8c8f

Agent brief

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# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-53hj-r94p-8c8f

Advisory: Kanidm has non-constant-time comparison of OAuth2 client_secret
IDs: GHSA-53hj-r94p-8c8f
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-53hj-r94p-8c8f (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:42 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Low (CVSS 3.7)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: kanidm 1.9.3. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- crates.io kanidm: affected <= 1.9.2; fixed in 1.9.3

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- crates.io kanidm: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on kanidm.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-53hj-r94p-8c8f (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-53hj-r94p-8c8f lists affected ranges: crates.io kanidm >=0 <=1.9.2)

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