Novu has SSRF via conditions filter webhook bypasses validateUrlSsrf() protection

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

not scored

EPSS

No dated EPSS signal available.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary The conditions filter webhook at libs/application-generic/src/usecases/conditions-filter/conditions-filter.usecase.ts line 261 sends POST requests to user-configured URLs using raw axios.post() with no SSRF validation. The HTTP Request workflow step in the same codebase correctly uses validateUrlSsrf() which blocks private IP ranges. The conditions webhook was not included in this protection. Root Cause conditions-filter.usecase.ts line 261: No call to validateUrlSsrf(). The webhookUrl comes from the workflow condition configuration with zero validation. Protected Code (for contrast) execute-http-request-step.usecase.ts line 130: This function resolves DNS and checks against private ranges (127.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, 169.254.0.0/16). It exists in the codebase but is not applied to the conditions webhook path. Proof of Concept 1. Create a workflow with a condition step 2. Configure the condition's webhook URL to…

Published by the source

14 Apr 2026, 23:22 UTC

Last modified by the source

14 Apr 2026, 23:36 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 12:48 UTC

1. Revision 2 · amended · 26 Oct 2026

   Amended from ghsa record GHSA-4x48-cgf9-q33f

2. Revision 1 · created · 24 Oct 2026

   Published from osv record GHSA-4x48-cgf9-q33f

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# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-4x48-cgf9-q33f

Advisory: Novu has SSRF via conditions filter webhook bypasses validateUrlSsrf() protection
IDs: GHSA-4x48-cgf9-q33f
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-4x48-cgf9-q33f (revision 2, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 12:48 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Unrated
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: @novu/api 3.15.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- npm @novu/api: affected < 3.15.0; fixed in 3.15.0

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `npm ls @novu/api --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on @novu/api.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-4x48-cgf9-q33f (OSV record GHSA-4x48-cgf9-q33f lists affected ranges: npm @novu/api >=0 <3.15.0 (fixed))
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4x48-cgf9-q33f (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-4x48-cgf9-q33f lists affected ranges: npm @novu/api >=0 <3.15.0)

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