ArcadeDB: Privilege escalation via reader role in /api/v1/command JS scripting language — arbitrary host file read

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

7.7 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

EPSS

No dated EPSS signal available.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Impact A user holding only reader (read-only) privileges on a single database could execute arbitrary JVM code by sending a "language": "js" command to the POST /api/v1/command/{database} HTTP endpoint, and use it to read arbitrary files on the host filesystem (e.g. /etc/passwd, configuration files), outside the scope of the database itself. Two cooperating defects made this possible: 1. Missing authorization on the scripting path (CWE-863 / CWE-269). Polyglot script execution (js and other GraalVM languages) never went through the database authorization checks applied to SQL/Cypher, so any authenticated principal - regardless of database role - could run scripts. 2. Sandbox whitelist bypass. The GraalVM sandbox restricts direct class lookups to a configured allowedPackages list, but a script could reach arbitrary classes by reflecting off the bound database object: database.getClass().getClassLoader().loadClass("java.io.File"). Process creation was already blocked…

Published by the source

16 Jul 2026, 20:13 UTC

Last modified by the source

16 Jul 2026, 20:13 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 16:54 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-48qw-824m-86pr

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# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-48qw-824m-86pr

Advisory: ArcadeDB: Privilege escalation via reader role in /api/v1/command JS scripting language — arbitrary host file read
IDs: GHSA-48qw-824m-86pr
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-48qw-824m-86pr (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 16:54 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 7.7)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: com.arcadedb:arcadedb-server 26.7.1. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Maven com.arcadedb:arcadedb-server: affected < 26.7.1; fixed in 26.7.1

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Maven com.arcadedb:arcadedb-server: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on com.arcadedb:arcadedb-server.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-48qw-824m-86pr (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-48qw-824m-86pr lists affected ranges: Maven com.arcadedb:arcadedb-server >=0 <26.7.1)

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