Panel::Software Customized WiX .be TEMP folder is vulnerable to DLL redirection attacks that allow the attacker to escalate privileges
What to do
Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (panelsw.custom.wix 3.15.0-a44), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
NuGet panelsw.custom.wix
- Affected
- < 3.15.0-a44
- Fixed in
- 3.15.0-a44
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-259p-rvjx-ffwg lists affected ranges: NuGet panelsw.custom.wix >=0 <3.15.0-a44
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- 8.2 · CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
- EPSS
- No dated EPSS signal available.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Summary .be TEMP folder is vulnerable to DLL redirection attacks that allow the attacker to escalate privileges. Details If the bundle is not run as admin, the user's TEMP folder is used and not the system TEMP folder. A utility is able to monitor the user's TEMP folder for changes and drop its own DLL into the .be/.Local folder immediately when the .be folder is created. When the burn engine elevates, the malicious DLL receives elevated privileges. PoC As a standard, non-admin user: 1. Monitor the user's TEMP folder for changes using ReadDirectoryChangesW 1. On FILEACTIONADDED, check if the folder name is .be 1. Create a folder in .be named after the bundle + .Local (e.g. MyInstaller.exe.Local) 1. Put the malicious COMCTL32.DLL in the .Local folder following the naming used for the real DLL (e.g. MyInstaller.exe.Local/x86microsoft.windows.common-controls.../COMCTL32.dll) 1. Do hacker things when the engine escalates and the malicious DLL is loaded Proper naming for the path can be…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-259p-rvjx-ffwg
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-259p-rvjx-ffwg Advisory: Panel::Software Customized WiX .be TEMP folder is vulnerable to DLL redirection attacks that allow the attacker to escalate privileges IDs: GHSA-259p-rvjx-ffwg Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-259p-rvjx-ffwg (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 17:00 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: High (CVSS 8.2) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: panelsw.custom.wix 3.15.0-a44. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - NuGet panelsw.custom.wix: affected < 3.15.0-a44; fixed in 3.15.0-a44 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - NuGet panelsw.custom.wix: check the installed version with your package manager. ## Supported action Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on panelsw.custom.wix. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-259p-rvjx-ffwg (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-259p-rvjx-ffwg lists affected ranges: NuGet panelsw.custom.wix >=0 <3.15.0-a44) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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