AdminNeo: CSRF Token Secret Recoverable from Single Observed Token, Enabling Cross-Site Request Forgery
CVE-2026-96629GHSA-wm25-49w3-5qrg
What to do
Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (adminneo-org/adminneo 5.5.1), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
Packagist adminneo-org/adminneo
- Affected
- < 5.5.1
- Fixed in
- 5.5.1
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-wm25-49w3-5qrg lists affected ranges: Packagist adminneo-org/adminneo >=0 <5.5.1
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
- Open Source Vulnerabilities (OSV.dev), including the GitHub Advisory Database
OSV record GHSA-wm25-49w3-5qrg lists affected ranges: Packagist adminneo-org/adminneo >=0 <5.5.1 (fixed)
VerifiedObserved Structured OSV record; GitHub-reviewed advisory.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- 6.8 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
- EPSS
- No dated EPSS signal available.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Summary AdminNeo's CSRF protection uses a BREACH-resistant XOR masking scheme, but the implementation transmits both the XOR mask and the masked value in every token. This allows any observer who sees a single CSRF token (via network sniffing, log files, Referrer header, or XSS) to instantly recover the session secret and forge unlimited valid CSRF tokens. Additionally, the underlying session token has only ~20 bits of entropy (`rand(1, 1e6)`), making blind brute-force feasible even without token observation. Originally reported by @az0mb13 in Adminer: GHSA-q4f2-39gr-45jh
Details Token generation in `admin/include/functions.inc.php` lines 1181-1184: ```php function get_token() { $rand = rand(1, 1e6); return ($rand ^ $_SESSION["token"]) . ":$rand"; } ``` Token verification in lines 1189-1192: ```php function verify_token() { list($token, $rand) = explode(":", $_POST["token"]); return ($rand ^…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 2 · amended ·
Amended from osv record GHSA-wm25-49w3-5qrg
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-wm25-49w3-5qrg
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-96629 Advisory: AdminNeo: CSRF Token Secret Recoverable from Single Observed Token, Enabling Cross-Site Request Forgery IDs: CVE-2026-96629, GHSA-wm25-49w3-5qrg Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-96629 (revision 2, source checked 31 Oct 2026, 06:45 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: Medium (CVSS 6.8) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: adminneo-org/adminneo 5.5.1. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - Packagist adminneo-org/adminneo: affected < 5.5.1; fixed in 5.5.1 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - Packagist adminneo-org/adminneo: check the installed version with your package manager. ## Supported action Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on adminneo-org/adminneo. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wm25-49w3-5qrg (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-wm25-49w3-5qrg lists affected ranges: Packagist adminneo-org/adminneo >=0 <5.5.1) - Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-wm25-49w3-5qrg (OSV record GHSA-wm25-49w3-5qrg lists affected ranges: Packagist adminneo-org/adminneo >=0 <5.5.1 (fixed)) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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