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High, CVSS 8.8amended

Arcane: Delegated users:update permission allows admin account takeover via password reset (no privilege-hierarchy check)

CVE-2026-96627GHSA-pw5q-rjx4-7f7p

What to do

Partial vendor fix. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check back for a fix.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

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Affected packages

  • Go github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend/v2

    Affected
    < 2.6.0
    Fixed in
    2.6.0

  • Go github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend

    Affected
    every version
    Fixed in
    no fixed version recorded

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS
8.8 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
EPSS
  • CVE-2026-96627: 0.37% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 30.70 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary A user holding the delegated users:update permission can reset the global administrator's password and take over the admin account. UpdateUser sets the target user's PasswordHash from the request body for ANY target with no comparison of caller-vs-target privilege. Because role assignment and role CRUD are deliberately gated by RequireGlobalAdmin, users:update is intended to sit BELOW admin (profile management); this finding defeats that separation. Root Cause UpdateUser (handler backend/api/handlers/users.go:317-323) loads the target by ID and sets userModel.PasswordHash from the request body for any user, then userService.UpdateUser (userservice.go:174) simply tx.Saves — with NO actor-vs-target privilege comparison. The only IsGlobalAdmin guard (userservice.go:345) is a last-admin check inside DeleteUser, not the update path. Role assignment / role CRUD are RequireGlobalAdmin (backend/pkg/authz/permissions.go:27-33), proving users:update is intended below admin. Impact…

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 3 · amended ·

    Amended from ghsa record GHSA-pw5q-rjx4-7f7p

  2. Revision 2 · amended ·

    Amended from osv record GO-2026-6807

  3. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from osv record GHSA-pw5q-rjx4-7f7p

Agent brief

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-96627

Advisory: Arcane: Delegated users:update permission allows admin account takeover via password reset (no privilege-hierarchy check)
IDs: CVE-2026-96627, GHSA-pw5q-rjx4-7f7p
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-96627 (revision 3, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:32 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 8.8)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Partial vendor fix; fixed versions by package: github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend/v2 2.6.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Go github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend/v2: affected < 2.6.0; fixed in 2.6.0
- Go github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend: affected every version

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Go github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend/v2: check the installed version with your package manager.
- Go github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend/v2, github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-6807 (OSV record GO-2026-6807 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend >=0; Go github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend/v2 >=0 <2.6.0 (fixed))
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-pw5q-rjx4-7f7p (OSV record GHSA-pw5q-rjx4-7f7p lists affected ranges: Go github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend/v2 >=0 <2.6.0 (fixed))
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-pw5q-rjx4-7f7p (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-pw5q-rjx4-7f7p lists affected ranges: Go github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend/v2 >=0 <2.6.0)

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