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Critical, CVSS 9.8amended

rclone serve s3: --auth-proxy without --auth-key authenticates nobody - full SigV4 signature bypass

CVE-2026-88018GHSA-xwwr-4h3p-r22c

What to do

Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (github.com/rclone/rclone 1.75.1), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

Affected packages

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS
9.8 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
EPSS
  • CVE-2026-88018: 0.51% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 43.61 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary rclone serve s3's handler chain, when --auth-proxy is configured, is (outermost first): authPairMiddleware - proxyAuthMiddleware - gofakes3's own SigV4-verifying handler. authPairMiddleware parses the accessKeyID straight out of the incoming request's own Authorization header (entirely client-controlled) and registers {accessKey: ws.s3Secret} into gofakes3's shared credential store via AddAuthKeys, for EVERY access key any client presents - not just ones previously known to the server. ws.s3Secret defaults to "" whenever --auth-key is not set, which the --auth-proxy documentation (and the reference bin/testproxy.py) presents as a complete, standalone authentication mechanism requiring no other flag - matching how it's used for serve webdav/ftp/sftp. gofakes3's SigV4 verification then checks the request's signature against exactly the secret authPairMiddleware just registered for that same client-chosen key. An empty string is a valid HMAC key, so a caller can trivially…

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 3 · amended ·

    Amended from ghsa record GHSA-xwwr-4h3p-r22c

  2. Revision 2 · amended ·

    Amended from osv record GO-2026-6462

  3. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from osv record GHSA-xwwr-4h3p-r22c

Agent brief

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-88018

Advisory: rclone serve s3: --auth-proxy without --auth-key authenticates nobody - full SigV4 signature bypass
IDs: CVE-2026-88018, GHSA-xwwr-4h3p-r22c
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-88018 (revision 3, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:29 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Critical (CVSS 9.8)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/rclone/rclone 1.75.1. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Go github.com/rclone/rclone: affected < 1.75.1; fixed in 1.75.1

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Go github.com/rclone/rclone: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on github.com/rclone/rclone.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-xwwr-4h3p-r22c (OSV record GHSA-xwwr-4h3p-r22c lists affected ranges: Go github.com/rclone/rclone >=0 <1.75.1 (fixed))
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-6462 (OSV record GO-2026-6462 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/rclone/rclone >=0 <1.75.1 (fixed))
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xwwr-4h3p-r22c (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-xwwr-4h3p-r22c lists affected ranges: Go github.com/rclone/rclone >=0 <1.75.1)

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