Skip to content

← Actionable
High, CVSS 8.2amended

libp2p: PeerStore accepts attacker-signed PeerRecords for a victim peer ID and stores certified attacker addresses

CVE-2026-86039GHSA-vrf4-mx87-p53w

What to do

Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (@libp2p/peer-store 12.0.24), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

Affected packages

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS
8.2 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L
EPSS
  • CVE-2026-86039: 0.27% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 19.20 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary @libp2p/peer-store accepts a signed PeerRecord whose envelope is signed by one peer but whose payload claims a different peer ID. The vulnerable consumePeerRecord path verifies the envelope signature, but does not verify that the envelope signer is the same peer as the wrapped PeerRecord.peerId. As a result, an attacker can sign a record with their own key while placing a victim peer ID in the payload, causing attacker-controlled multiaddrs to be stored as certified addresses for the victim. Details The vulnerable code is in packages/peer-store/src/index.ts: - RecordEnvelope.openAndCertify(buf, PeerRecord.DOMAIN, options) verifies the envelope signature. - const peerId = peerIdFromCID(envelope.publicKey.toCID()) derives the envelope signer peer ID. - The optional expectedPeer check only compares expectedPeer to the envelope signer. - const peerRecord = PeerRecord.createFromProtobuf(envelope.payload) decodes peerRecord.peerId from attacker-controlled signed payload bytes. -…

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 3 · amended ·

    Amended from ghsa record GHSA-vrf4-mx87-p53w

  2. Revision 2 · amended ·

    Amended from osv record GHSA-vrf4-mx87-p53w

  3. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from ghsa record GHSA-vrf4-mx87-p53w

Agent brief

Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.

# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-86039

Advisory: libp2p: PeerStore accepts attacker-signed PeerRecords for a victim peer ID and stores certified attacker addresses
IDs: CVE-2026-86039, GHSA-vrf4-mx87-p53w
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-86039 (revision 3, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 13:02 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 8.2)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: @libp2p/peer-store 12.0.24. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- npm @libp2p/peer-store: affected >= 8.0.0, < 12.0.24; fixed in 12.0.24

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `npm ls @libp2p/peer-store --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on @libp2p/peer-store.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vrf4-mx87-p53w (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-vrf4-mx87-p53w lists affected ranges: npm @libp2p/peer-store >=8.0.0 <12.0.24)
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-vrf4-mx87-p53w (OSV record GHSA-vrf4-mx87-p53w lists affected ranges: npm @libp2p/peer-store >=8.0.0 <12.0.24 (fixed))

Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.

Loading voting…