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Medium, CVSS 6.8amended

Distribution: Client manifests.Get() does not verify returned content against requested digest

CVE-2026-85747GHSA-685w-q87j-wqw3

What to do

Partial vendor fix. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check back for a fix.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

Affected packages

  • Go github.com/distribution/distribution/v3

    Affected
    < 3.1.2
    Fixed in
    3.1.2
  • Go github.com/docker/distribution

    Affected
    <= 2.8.3
    Fixed in
    no fixed version recorded

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS
6.8 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N
EPSS
  • CVE-2026-85747: 0.22% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 12.31 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary registry/client.(manifests).Get(ctx, dgst, …) fetches a manifest by digest but never hashes the returned body and compares it against the requested digest. A malicious or compromised registry, or any MITM on the registry connection, can serve arbitrary manifest bytes in response to a digest-pinned request and the client returns the substituted content transparently to the caller. Any application relying on digest pinning for supply-chain integrity — image policy controllers, mirrors, pull-through caches — is silently undermined. The bundled pull-through proxy (registry/proxy/proxymanifeststore.go) is itself an unguarded consumer and is directly exploitable. Details Root cause: registry/client/repository.go:488-505 reads the response body and passes it directly to distribution.UnmarshalManifest without ever computing digest.FromBytes(body) and comparing against the caller-supplied dgst. The Docker-Content-Digest response header is parsed (lines 251-292 in…

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 2 · amended ·

    Amended from ghsa record GHSA-685w-q87j-wqw3

  2. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from osv record GHSA-685w-q87j-wqw3

Agent brief

Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.

# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-85747

Advisory: Distribution: Client `manifests.Get()` does not verify returned content against requested digest
IDs: CVE-2026-85747, GHSA-685w-q87j-wqw3
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-85747 (revision 2, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:32 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 6.8)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Partial vendor fix; fixed versions by package: github.com/distribution/distribution/v3 3.1.2. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Go github.com/distribution/distribution/v3: affected < 3.1.2; fixed in 3.1.2
- Go github.com/docker/distribution: affected <= 2.8.3

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Go github.com/distribution/distribution/v3: check the installed version with your package manager.
- Go github.com/docker/distribution: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on github.com/distribution/distribution/v3, github.com/docker/distribution.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-685w-q87j-wqw3 (OSV record GHSA-685w-q87j-wqw3 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/docker/distribution >=0 =0 <3.1.2 (fixed))
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-685w-q87j-wqw3 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-685w-q87j-wqw3 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/docker/distribution >=0 =0 <3.1.2)

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