Distribution: Client manifests.Get() does not verify returned content against requested digest
CVE-2026-85747GHSA-685w-q87j-wqw3
What to do
Partial vendor fix. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check back for a fix.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
Go github.com/distribution/distribution/v3
- Affected
- < 3.1.2
- Fixed in
- 3.1.2
Go github.com/docker/distribution
- Affected
- <= 2.8.3
- Fixed in
- no fixed version recorded
Sources
- Open Source Vulnerabilities (OSV.dev), including the GitHub Advisory Database
OSV record GHSA-685w-q87j-wqw3 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/docker/distribution >=0 =0 <3.1.2 (fixed)
VerifiedObserved Structured OSV record; GitHub-reviewed advisory.
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-685w-q87j-wqw3 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/docker/distribution >=0 =0 <3.1.2
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- 6.8 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N
- EPSS
- CVE-2026-85747: 0.22% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 12.31 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Summary registry/client.(manifests).Get(ctx, dgst, …) fetches a manifest by digest but never hashes the returned body and compares it against the requested digest. A malicious or compromised registry, or any MITM on the registry connection, can serve arbitrary manifest bytes in response to a digest-pinned request and the client returns the substituted content transparently to the caller. Any application relying on digest pinning for supply-chain integrity — image policy controllers, mirrors, pull-through caches — is silently undermined. The bundled pull-through proxy (registry/proxy/proxymanifeststore.go) is itself an unguarded consumer and is directly exploitable. Details Root cause: registry/client/repository.go:488-505 reads the response body and passes it directly to distribution.UnmarshalManifest without ever computing digest.FromBytes(body) and comparing against the caller-supplied dgst. The Docker-Content-Digest response header is parsed (lines 251-292 in…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 2 · amended ·
Amended from ghsa record GHSA-685w-q87j-wqw3
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from osv record GHSA-685w-q87j-wqw3
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-85747 Advisory: Distribution: Client `manifests.Get()` does not verify returned content against requested digest IDs: CVE-2026-85747, GHSA-685w-q87j-wqw3 Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-85747 (revision 2, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:32 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: Medium (CVSS 6.8) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Partial vendor fix; fixed versions by package: github.com/distribution/distribution/v3 3.1.2. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - Go github.com/distribution/distribution/v3: affected < 3.1.2; fixed in 3.1.2 - Go github.com/docker/distribution: affected <= 2.8.3 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - Go github.com/distribution/distribution/v3: check the installed version with your package manager. - Go github.com/docker/distribution: check the installed version with your package manager. ## Supported action No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on github.com/distribution/distribution/v3, github.com/docker/distribution. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-685w-q87j-wqw3 (OSV record GHSA-685w-q87j-wqw3 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/docker/distribution >=0 =0 <3.1.2 (fixed)) - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-685w-q87j-wqw3 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-685w-q87j-wqw3 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/docker/distribution >=0 =0 <3.1.2) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
Loading voting…