Moquette: Pattern-ACL wildcard injection (cross-tenant authorization bypass) plus a remote-unauthenticated DoS cluster, a Will-message authorization bypass, and a cross-session durable-corruption bug

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

9.6 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

EPSS

• CVE-2026-85724: 0.32% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 24.54 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
• CVE-2026-95842: 0.44% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 38.11 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
• CVE-2026-95843: 0.43% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 37.17 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
• CVE-2026-95844: 0.42% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 36.70 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
• CVE-2026-95845: 0.41% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 35.83 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
• CVE-2026-95846: 0.32% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 24.93 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
• CVE-2026-95847: 0.34% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 27.66 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
• CVE-2026-95848: 0.42% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 36.72 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

moquette is reachable by untrusted MQTT clients (anonymous by default), so every byte from any client, including pre-authentication, is untrusted. This is a memory-safe JVM: the ceiling is authorization/ACL bypass + denial of service + cross-session integrity, not RCE (I did not find one and do not claim one). Audited at commit da7f719a6bab9829d520b5838e13ea7b1f9be3ef, module broker/. What a connecting client can do 1. (Critical) Bypass pattern-based ACLs across tenants. In AuthorizationsCollector.canDoOperation (AuthorizationsCollector.java:116-131, esp. line 123) the clientId/username is substituted raw into a pattern ACL rule and then wildcard-matched, and the clientId is never validated for MQTT wildcard characters +/

at CONNECT (MQTTConnection.processConnect): Topic substitutedTopic = new Topic(auth.topic.toString().replace("%c", client).replace("%u", username)); if (topic.match(substitutedTopic)) return true; A client that connects with clientId + turns sensor/%c/

into the…

Published by the source

23 Sep 2026, 16:11 UTC

Last modified by the source

19 Oct 2026, 19:30 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 16:58 UTC

1. Revision 2 · amended · 26 Oct 2026

   Amended from ghsa record GHSA-5f42-97gr-vfhq

2. Revision 1 · created · 24 Oct 2026

   Published from osv record GHSA-5f42-97gr-vfhq

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-85724

Advisory: Moquette: Pattern-ACL wildcard injection (cross-tenant authorization bypass) plus a remote-unauthenticated DoS cluster, a Will-message authorization bypass, and a cross-session durable-corruption bug
IDs: CVE-2026-85724, GHSA-5f42-97gr-vfhq
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-85724 (revision 2, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 16:58 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Critical (CVSS 9.6)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: io.moquette:moquette-broker 0.18.1. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Maven io.moquette:moquette-broker: affected <= 0.18.0; fixed in 0.18.1

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Maven io.moquette:moquette-broker: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on io.moquette:moquette-broker.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-5f42-97gr-vfhq (OSV record GHSA-5f42-97gr-vfhq lists affected ranges: Maven io.moquette:moquette-broker >=0 <0.18.1 (fixed))
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5f42-97gr-vfhq (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-5f42-97gr-vfhq lists affected ranges: Maven io.moquette:moquette-broker >=0 <=0.18.0)

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