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Medium, CVSS 6.4amended

Nautobot: Authorization bypass in approval workflow REST API allows self-approval and unauthorized activation of scheduled jobs

CVE-2026-83805GHSA-q4c5-2j6f-r476

What to do

Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (nautobot 3.1.8), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

Affected packages

  • PyPI nautobot

    Affected
    >= 3.0.0, < 3.1.8
    Fixed in
    3.1.8

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS
6.4 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
EPSS
  • CVE-2026-83805: 0.29% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 22.11 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Impact This is an authorization bypass that escalates into unauthorized server-side job execution. 1. Primary impact - self-approval: The approver checks (approver-group membership, change permission on the object under review, one-response-per-user) are enforced only in the approve/deny actions on ApprovalWorkflowStage. The generic ApprovalWorkflowStageResponse create endpoint enforces none of them, so a user holding only extras.addapprovalworkflowstageresponse can POST approved responses directly and drive a stage past its minapprovers threshold with no legitimate approver involved. The serializer also exposes user and state as writable, letting the attacker attribute responses to arbitrary users. 2. Escalated impact job activation: Because the approval workflow gates a ScheduledJob, self-approval does not stop at the approval record. Stage approval cascades through ApprovalWorkflow.save() to onworkflowapproved(), which sets the target job to enabled/active. Patches Fixed in…

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 3 · amended ·

    Amended from ghsa record GHSA-q4c5-2j6f-r476

  2. Revision 2 · amended ·

    Amended from osv record GHSA-q4c5-2j6f-r476

  3. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from ghsa record GHSA-q4c5-2j6f-r476

Agent brief

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-83805

Advisory: Nautobot: Authorization bypass in approval workflow REST API allows self-approval and unauthorized activation of scheduled jobs
IDs: CVE-2026-83805, GHSA-q4c5-2j6f-r476
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-83805 (revision 3, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 13:54 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 6.4)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: nautobot 3.1.8. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- PyPI nautobot: affected >= 3.0.0, < 3.1.8; fixed in 3.1.8

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `python -m pip show nautobot`: prints the installed version. Run with the environment that serves production active.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on nautobot.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q4c5-2j6f-r476 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-q4c5-2j6f-r476 lists affected ranges: PyPI nautobot >=3.0.0 <3.1.8)
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-q4c5-2j6f-r476 (OSV record GHSA-q4c5-2j6f-r476 lists affected ranges: PyPI nautobot >=3.0.0 <3.1.8 (fixed))

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