pnpm: Virtual store linker path traversal via unvalidated depPath name in lockfileToDepGraph

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

7.1 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L

EPSS

• CVE-2026-82392: 0.61% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 49.52 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary The virtual store linker constructs package installation directories using path.join(modules, pkgName) where pkgName is extracted from lockfile packages keys via dp.parse(depPath).name without validation. A crafted pnpm-lock.yaml with traversal sequences in depPath keys (e.g., ../../../tmp/pwned@1.0.0) causes package content to be written to arbitrary filesystem paths during pnpm install. This is an incomplete fix of GHSA-fr4h-3cph-29xv — the safeJoinModulesDir containment helper was applied to the hoisted linker and symlinkDependency but NOT to the virtual store linker's lockfileToDepGraph.ts:233. Details Root Cause dp.parse() at pnpm11/deps/path/src/index.ts:135 extracts the package name as: This is a raw substring operation with zero validation that name is a valid npm package name. A depPath of ../../../tmp/pwned@1.0.0 yields name = '../../../tmp/pwned'. Vulnerable Code Path 1. pnpm-lock.yaml → lockfile.packages['../../../../../../../tmp/pwned@1.0.0'] (attacker-controlled…

Published by the source

2 Sep 2026, 14:37 UTC

Last modified by the source

2 Sep 2026, 14:37 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 13:02 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-c59q-g84q-2gj5

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-82392

Advisory: pnpm: Virtual store linker path traversal via unvalidated depPath name in lockfileToDepGraph
IDs: CVE-2026-82392, GHSA-c59q-g84q-2gj5
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-82392 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 13:02 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 7.1)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: pnpm 11.11.0, 10.34.5. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- npm pnpm: affected < 10.34.5; >= 11.0.0, < 11.11.0; fixed in 10.34.5, 11.11.0

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `npm ls pnpm --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on pnpm.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-c59q-g84q-2gj5 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-c59q-g84q-2gj5 lists affected ranges: npm pnpm >=0 =11.0.0 <11.11.0)

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