obsidian-tc tokens can access arbitrary configured vaults

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

9.9 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

EPSS

• CVE-2026-77366: 0.31% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 23.75 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Impact Tool dispatch did not check the caller-supplied input.vault against the caller's bound vault (ctx.vaultId); the folder ACL was a single global instance and the JWT carried no vault claim. As a result, any valid token could read, write, or delete any configured vault by passing input.vault, defeating multi-tenant isolation across ~90 tool sites. (resources/read was the only surface that already guarded this.) Patches Fixed in 1.3.1 (the fix was developed on the v1.3.0 tag, which never published to npm; 1.3.1 is the first published release with the fix). Upgrade to = 1.3.1. Workarounds Run a single vault per server process, or isolate each tenant on a separate process/credential. Fix A central input.vault === ctx.vaultId guard was added in dispatch before the scope check.

Published by the source

23 Oct 2026, 17:29 UTC

Last modified by the source

23 Oct 2026, 17:45 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 13:07 UTC

1. Revision 3 · amended · 26 Oct 2026

   Amended from ghsa record GHSA-84c9-qqpq-2pq5

2. Revision 2 · amended · 24 Oct 2026

   Amended from osv record GHSA-84c9-qqpq-2pq5

3. Revision 1 · created · 23 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-84c9-qqpq-2pq5

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-77366

Advisory: obsidian-tc tokens can access arbitrary configured vaults
IDs: CVE-2026-77366, GHSA-84c9-qqpq-2pq5
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-77366 (revision 3, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 13:07 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Critical (CVSS 9.9)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: obsidian-tc 1.3.1. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- npm obsidian-tc: affected < 1.3.1; fixed in 1.3.1

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `npm ls obsidian-tc --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on obsidian-tc.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-84c9-qqpq-2pq5 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-84c9-qqpq-2pq5 lists affected ranges: npm obsidian-tc >=0 <1.3.1)
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-84c9-qqpq-2pq5 (OSV record GHSA-84c9-qqpq-2pq5 lists affected ranges: npm obsidian-tc >=0 <1.3.1 (fixed))

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