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Medium, CVSS 6.5amended

MCP Atlassian: Path traversal in upload_attachment allows arbitrary file read (incomplete fix for CVE-2026-27825)

CVE-2026-77269GHSA-h7wj-5v37-59r2

What to do

Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (mcp-atlassian 0.22.0), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

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Affected packages

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS
6.5 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
EPSS
  • CVE-2026-77269: 0.43% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 37.29 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary The confluenceuploadattachment and confluenceuploadattachments MCP tools accept a filepath parameter and do not validate that the path is confined to an allowed directory before opening the file. An attacker who can call these tools can read any file accessible to the MCP server process (SSH keys, .env files, API credentials) and exfiltrate it by uploading it to Confluence. Note: The Jira uploadattachment mixin method in jira/attachments.py has the same missing validation, but it is NOT registered as an MCP tool in servers/jira.py and is therefore not currently reachable via MCP. It should still be patched to prevent future exposure if Jira upload tools are added. This is an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-27825. That CVE was patched by adding validatesafepath() to download operations (v0.17.0). The same protection was not applied to upload operations. Details validatesafepath() is imported in both confluence/attachments.py and jira/attachments.py and is correctly called in all…

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 3 · amended ·

    Amended from ghsa record GHSA-h7wj-5v37-59r2

  2. Revision 2 · amended ·

    Amended from osv record GHSA-h7wj-5v37-59r2

  3. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from ghsa record GHSA-h7wj-5v37-59r2

Agent brief

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-77269

Advisory: MCP Atlassian: Path traversal in upload_attachment allows arbitrary file read (incomplete fix for CVE-2026-27825)
IDs: CVE-2026-77269, GHSA-h7wj-5v37-59r2
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-77269 (revision 3, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 13:54 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 6.5)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: mcp-atlassian 0.22.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- PyPI mcp-atlassian: affected < 0.22.0; fixed in 0.22.0

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `python -m pip show mcp-atlassian`: prints the installed version. Run with the environment that serves production active.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on mcp-atlassian.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-h7wj-5v37-59r2 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-h7wj-5v37-59r2 lists affected ranges: PyPI mcp-atlassian >=0 <0.22.0)
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-h7wj-5v37-59r2 (OSV record GHSA-h7wj-5v37-59r2 lists affected ranges: PyPI mcp-atlassian >=0 <0.22.0 (fixed))

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