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High, CVSS 8.6amended

MCP Atlassian: Unauthenticated arbitrary local file read via upload_attachment file_path, chained with missing auth on streamable-http transport

CVE-2026-77248GHSA-cc5h-2pwp-pvcc

What to do

Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (mcp-atlassian 0.22.0), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

Affected packages

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS
8.6 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
EPSS
  • CVE-2026-77248: 0.47% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 41.10 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary In the documented multi-user HTTP deployment (--transport streamable-http with global operator Atlassian credentials), sooperset/mcp-atlassian exposes all tools to unauthenticated network clients, and the uploadattachment tool reads an attacker-supplied filepath with no path validation. Chained, an unauthenticated network attacker reads arbitrary files on the MCP server host (e.g. /proc/self/environ → the operator's Atlassian API token + .env secrets, ~/.ssh/idrsa, /etc/passwd) by uploading them to an attacker-chosen page/issue and reading them back. Details Missing authentication (transport): - streamable-http binds 0.0.0.0 by default (src/mcpatlassian/init.py:151). - The OAuth-proxy auth provider is opt-in (ATLASSIANOAUTHPROXYENABLE, default false), so mainmcp is built with auth=None (src/mcpatlassian/servers/main.py:724-731, 813-817). - UserTokenMiddleware.parseauthheader sets authvalidationerror only for a malformed Authorization header; a request with no Authorization…

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 3 · amended ·

    Amended from ghsa record GHSA-cc5h-2pwp-pvcc

  2. Revision 2 · amended ·

    Amended from osv record GHSA-cc5h-2pwp-pvcc

  3. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from ghsa record GHSA-cc5h-2pwp-pvcc

Agent brief

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-77248

Advisory: MCP Atlassian: Unauthenticated arbitrary local file read via upload_attachment file_path, chained with missing auth on streamable-http transport
IDs: CVE-2026-77248, GHSA-cc5h-2pwp-pvcc
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-77248 (revision 3, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 13:54 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 8.6)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: mcp-atlassian 0.22.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- PyPI mcp-atlassian: affected < 0.22.0; fixed in 0.22.0

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `python -m pip show mcp-atlassian`: prints the installed version. Run with the environment that serves production active.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on mcp-atlassian.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-cc5h-2pwp-pvcc (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-cc5h-2pwp-pvcc lists affected ranges: PyPI mcp-atlassian >=0 <0.22.0)
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-cc5h-2pwp-pvcc (OSV record GHSA-cc5h-2pwp-pvcc lists affected ranges: PyPI mcp-atlassian >=0 <0.22.0 (fixed))

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