MCP Atlassian: Unauthenticated arbitrary local file read via upload_attachment file_path, chained with missing auth on streamable-http transport
CVE-2026-77248GHSA-cc5h-2pwp-pvcc
What to do
Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (mcp-atlassian 0.22.0), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
PyPI mcp-atlassian
- Affected
- < 0.22.0
- Fixed in
- 0.22.0
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-cc5h-2pwp-pvcc lists affected ranges: PyPI mcp-atlassian >=0 <0.22.0
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
- Open Source Vulnerabilities (OSV.dev), including the GitHub Advisory Database
OSV record GHSA-cc5h-2pwp-pvcc lists affected ranges: PyPI mcp-atlassian >=0 <0.22.0 (fixed)
VerifiedObserved Structured OSV record; GitHub-reviewed advisory.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- 8.6 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
- EPSS
- CVE-2026-77248: 0.47% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 41.10 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Summary In the documented multi-user HTTP deployment (--transport streamable-http with global operator Atlassian credentials), sooperset/mcp-atlassian exposes all tools to unauthenticated network clients, and the uploadattachment tool reads an attacker-supplied filepath with no path validation. Chained, an unauthenticated network attacker reads arbitrary files on the MCP server host (e.g. /proc/self/environ → the operator's Atlassian API token + .env secrets, ~/.ssh/idrsa, /etc/passwd) by uploading them to an attacker-chosen page/issue and reading them back. Details Missing authentication (transport): - streamable-http binds 0.0.0.0 by default (src/mcpatlassian/init.py:151). - The OAuth-proxy auth provider is opt-in (ATLASSIANOAUTHPROXYENABLE, default false), so mainmcp is built with auth=None (src/mcpatlassian/servers/main.py:724-731, 813-817). - UserTokenMiddleware.parseauthheader sets authvalidationerror only for a malformed Authorization header; a request with no Authorization…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 3 · amended ·
Amended from ghsa record GHSA-cc5h-2pwp-pvcc
- Revision 2 · amended ·
Amended from osv record GHSA-cc5h-2pwp-pvcc
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-cc5h-2pwp-pvcc
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-77248 Advisory: MCP Atlassian: Unauthenticated arbitrary local file read via upload_attachment file_path, chained with missing auth on streamable-http transport IDs: CVE-2026-77248, GHSA-cc5h-2pwp-pvcc Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-77248 (revision 3, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 13:54 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: High (CVSS 8.6) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: mcp-atlassian 0.22.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - PyPI mcp-atlassian: affected < 0.22.0; fixed in 0.22.0 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - `python -m pip show mcp-atlassian`: prints the installed version. Run with the environment that serves production active. ## Supported action Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on mcp-atlassian. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-cc5h-2pwp-pvcc (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-cc5h-2pwp-pvcc lists affected ranges: PyPI mcp-atlassian >=0 <0.22.0) - Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-cc5h-2pwp-pvcc (OSV record GHSA-cc5h-2pwp-pvcc lists affected ranges: PyPI mcp-atlassian >=0 <0.22.0 (fixed)) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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