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Unratedamended

MCP Atlassian: Arbitrary server-local file upload to Jira/Confluence attachments via unrestricted file_path parameters

CVE-2026-77247GHSA-f6pj-qv47-g96w

What to do

Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (mcp-atlassian 0.22.0), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

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Affected packages

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS
not scored
EPSS
  • CVE-2026-77247: 0.39% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 32.96 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary The Jira and Confluence attachment upload tools accept caller-controlled file path parameters and read those paths from the MCP server's local filesystem before uploading the file as an Atlassian attachment. In local stdio deployments, this can expose files readable by the user's MCP process. In documented HTTP/SSE or streamable-http deployments, the impact is higher: any MCP client that is allowed to invoke write/upload tools can cause the server process to read a server-local file and upload it to Jira or Confluence. This is not dependent on an AI prompt injection or model behavior. It can be triggered deterministically with a normal MCP tool call. Details The vulnerable behavior exists because upload tool arguments are treated as server-local filesystem paths. Relevant implementation points: - mcpatlassian.confluence.attachments.AttachmentsMixin.uploadattachment - Accepts filepath. - Converts the supplied value to an absolute path when needed. - Checks existence with…

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 3 · amended ·

    Amended from ghsa record GHSA-f6pj-qv47-g96w

  2. Revision 2 · amended ·

    Amended from osv record GHSA-f6pj-qv47-g96w

  3. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from ghsa record GHSA-f6pj-qv47-g96w

Agent brief

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-77247

Advisory: MCP Atlassian: Arbitrary server-local file upload to Jira/Confluence attachments via unrestricted file_path parameters
IDs: CVE-2026-77247, GHSA-f6pj-qv47-g96w
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-77247 (revision 3, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 13:54 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Unrated
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: mcp-atlassian 0.22.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- PyPI mcp-atlassian: affected < 0.22.0; fixed in 0.22.0

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `python -m pip show mcp-atlassian`: prints the installed version. Run with the environment that serves production active.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on mcp-atlassian.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-f6pj-qv47-g96w (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-f6pj-qv47-g96w lists affected ranges: PyPI mcp-atlassian >=0 <0.22.0)
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-f6pj-qv47-g96w (OSV record GHSA-f6pj-qv47-g96w lists affected ranges: PyPI mcp-atlassian >=0 <0.22.0 (fixed))

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