[mcp-atlassian] Authentication bypass in HTTP transport: AtlassianOpaqueTokenVerifier accepts any non-empty token
CVE-2026-77244GHSA-wrhw-j3f9-8vc6
What to do
Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (mcp-atlassian 0.22.0), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
PyPI mcp-atlassian
- Affected
- < 0.22.0
- Fixed in
- 0.22.0
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-wrhw-j3f9-8vc6 lists affected ranges: PyPI mcp-atlassian >=0 <0.22.0
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
- Open Source Vulnerabilities (OSV.dev), including the GitHub Advisory Database
OSV record GHSA-wrhw-j3f9-8vc6 lists affected ranges: PyPI mcp-atlassian >=0 <0.22.0 (fixed)
VerifiedObserved Structured OSV record; GitHub-reviewed advisory.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- 10.0 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
- EPSS
- CVE-2026-77244: 0.35% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 28.25 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Description mcp-atlassian deploys in two common patterns: Pattern A (single-user, server-side credentials): operator sets JIRAUSERNAME + JIRAAPITOKEN (or CONFLUENCEUSERNAME + CONFLUENCEAPITOKEN) in environment variables. Server uses these to call Jira/Confluence. This is the documented quickstart pattern. Pattern B (multi-user, OAuth or per-request PAT): operator sets up OAuth proxy or accepts per-user tokens via Authorization or service headers. The authentication mechanism in HTTP transport has two issues that combine to permit unauthenticated access to Pattern A deployments: 1. AtlassianOpaqueTokenVerifier.verifytoken() at src/mcpatlassian/utils/tokenverifier.py accepts any non-empty string as a valid token: async def verifytoken(self, token: str) - AccessToken | None: if not token: return None scopes = self.requiredscopes or [] return AccessToken( token=token, clientid="atlassian", scopes=scopes, expiresat=int(time.time()) + 86400 30, ) The docstring documents this: "we accept…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 3 · amended ·
Amended from ghsa record GHSA-wrhw-j3f9-8vc6
- Revision 2 · amended ·
Amended from osv record GHSA-wrhw-j3f9-8vc6
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-wrhw-j3f9-8vc6
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-77244 Advisory: [mcp-atlassian] Authentication bypass in HTTP transport: AtlassianOpaqueTokenVerifier accepts any non-empty token IDs: CVE-2026-77244, GHSA-wrhw-j3f9-8vc6 Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-77244 (revision 3, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 13:54 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: Critical (CVSS 10.0) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: mcp-atlassian 0.22.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - PyPI mcp-atlassian: affected < 0.22.0; fixed in 0.22.0 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - `python -m pip show mcp-atlassian`: prints the installed version. Run with the environment that serves production active. ## Supported action Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on mcp-atlassian. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wrhw-j3f9-8vc6 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-wrhw-j3f9-8vc6 lists affected ranges: PyPI mcp-atlassian >=0 <0.22.0) - Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-wrhw-j3f9-8vc6 (OSV record GHSA-wrhw-j3f9-8vc6 lists affected ranges: PyPI mcp-atlassian >=0 <0.22.0 (fixed)) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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