GitPython: Arbitrary Git Repository Creation Outside the Working Tree via Unvalidated .gitmodules Submodule Name in GitPython

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

8.2 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:L

EPSS

• CVE-2026-76222: 0.42% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 36.57 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary GitPython computes the on-disk location of a submodule's separate Git directory (.git/modules/<name) from the submodule's .gitmodules section name with no validation. Because that name is fully attacker-controlled content of a cloned repository, a malicious repository can set a submodule name to a traversal string (e.g. ../../../../home/victim/.something) and cause GitPython to create and initialize a full Git repository at an attacker-chosen filesystem path outside the intended clone directory. The only precondition is that a victim clones the malicious repository with GitPython and runs submodule initialization (submoduleupdate(init=True) / sm.update(init=True)), a very common and often automatic step. Core Git itself already blocks this exact attack class (CVE-2018-11235), but GitPython's independent reimplementation never adopted an equivalent check. Details src/GitPython/git/objects/submodule/util.py smname() strips the submodule " / " wrapper from a .gitmodules…

Published by the source

7 Aug 2026, 15:45 UTC

Last modified by the source

8 Sep 2026, 20:55 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 13:51 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-76222

Advisory: GitPython: Arbitrary Git Repository Creation Outside the Working Tree via Unvalidated .gitmodules Submodule Name in GitPython
IDs: CVE-2026-76222, GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-76222 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 13:51 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 8.2)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: gitpython 3.1.58. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- PyPI gitpython: affected <= 3.1.57; fixed in 3.1.58

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `python -m pip show gitpython`: prints the installed version. Run with the environment that serves production active.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on gitpython.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc lists affected ranges: PyPI gitpython >=0 <=3.1.57)

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