CKAN MCP Server: Cache-key canonicalization collision enables cache confusion / poisoning
CVE-2026-73846GHSA-78x9-fhhx-v2g6
What to do
Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (@aborruso/ckan-mcp-server 0.4.112), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
- Affected
- < 0.4.112
- Fixed in
- 0.4.112
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-78x9-fhhx-v2g6 lists affected ranges: npm @aborruso/ckan-mcp-server >=0 <0.4.112
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- 6.5 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N
- EPSS
- CVE-2026-73846: 0.19% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 9.21 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Summary The response cache derives its key from an ambiguous string serialization of the request parameters. canonicalizeParams joins sorted ${key}=${value} pairs with & and does not escape &, =, or the | field separators used in buildCacheKey. Two different logical parameter sets can therefore serialize to the same key and share one cache entry. Because the cached value is whatever the upstream returned for whichever request populated the entry first, an attacker can prime a colliding key so a victim's distinct query (same serverurl) is served the attacker's cached response. Affected code Confirmed collisions (identical key): - { q: "budget", rows: 10 } ≡ { q: "budget&rows=10" } → both canonicalize to q=budget&rows=10 - { filters: { a: "b" } } ≡ { filters: '{"a":"b"}' } → both canonicalize to filters={"a":"b"} (object-vs-string ambiguity) An attacker can reproduce any target canonical string by injecting it into the alphabetically-first parameter, so the collision is general, not…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-78x9-fhhx-v2g6
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-73846 Advisory: CKAN MCP Server: Cache-key canonicalization collision enables cache confusion / poisoning IDs: CVE-2026-73846, GHSA-78x9-fhhx-v2g6 Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-73846 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 13:02 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: Medium (CVSS 6.5) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: @aborruso/ckan-mcp-server 0.4.112. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - npm @aborruso/ckan-mcp-server: affected < 0.4.112; fixed in 0.4.112 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - `npm ls @aborruso/ckan-mcp-server --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`. ## Supported action Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on @aborruso/ckan-mcp-server. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-78x9-fhhx-v2g6 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-78x9-fhhx-v2g6 lists affected ranges: npm @aborruso/ckan-mcp-server >=0 <0.4.112) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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