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Medium, CVSS 5.3amended

OpenChoreo: Unauthenticated build/workflow trigger via git-provider confusion (webhook signature bypass)

CVE-2026-73840GHSA-c5f6-2rm9-2w8g

What to do

Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo 1.2.0-rc.2, 1.1.3, 1.0.3), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

Affected packages

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS
5.3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
EPSS
  • CVE-2026-73840: 0.35% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 28.27 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary The OpenChoreo autobuild webhook endpoint (POST /api/v1alpha1/autobuild) selected the git provider used to authenticate an incoming webhook from a client-supplied request header rather than from the target component's configuration, and its Bitbucket provider accepted requests without a valid signature. A caller could set the X-Event-Key header to be treated as a Bitbucket webhook, bypassing the HMAC secret that otherwise protects GitHub and GitLab webhooks, and trigger a component build without authenticating. Impact An attacker who can reach the autobuild webhook endpoint and knows the repository URL and branch configured for an auto-build component can trigger a build for that component without authenticating — including components configured for GitHub or GitLab, since the provider used or verification is chosen by the caller rather than by the component's configuration. The triggered build runs against a commit SHA supplied by the attacker, and the component lookup is…

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 3 · amended ·

    Amended from ghsa record GHSA-c5f6-2rm9-2w8g

  2. Revision 2 · amended ·

    Amended from osv record GO-2026-6360

  3. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from osv record GHSA-c5f6-2rm9-2w8g

Agent brief

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-73840

Advisory: OpenChoreo: Unauthenticated build/workflow trigger via git-provider confusion (webhook signature bypass)
IDs: CVE-2026-73840, GHSA-c5f6-2rm9-2w8g
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-73840 (revision 3, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:29 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 5.3)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo 1.2.0-rc.2, 1.1.3, 1.0.3. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Go github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo: affected < 1.0.3; >= 1.1.0, < 1.1.3; >= 1.2.0-rc.1, < 1.2.0-rc.2; fixed in 1.2.0-rc.2, 1.1.3, 1.0.3

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Go github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-c5f6-2rm9-2w8g (OSV record GHSA-c5f6-2rm9-2w8g lists affected ranges: Go github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo >=0 =1.1.0 =1.2.0-rc.1 <1.2.0-rc.2 (fixed))
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-6360 (OSV record GO-2026-6360 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo >=0 =1.1.0 =1.2.0-rc.1 <1.2.0-rc.2 (fixed))
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-c5f6-2rm9-2w8g (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-c5f6-2rm9-2w8g lists affected ranges: Go github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo >=0 =1.1.0 =1.2.0-rc.1 <1.2.0-rc.2)

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