Budibase: Privilege escalation via public role assignment API missing app-level authorization
CVE-2026-73305GHSA-j9fc-w3mr-x6mv
What to do
Vendor response not established. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check back for a fix.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
npm @budibase/server
- Affected
- <= 3.38.1
- Fixed in
- no fixed version recorded
Sources
- Open Source Vulnerabilities (OSV.dev), including the GitHub Advisory Database
OSV record GHSA-j9fc-w3mr-x6mv lists affected ranges: npm @budibase/server >=0 <=3.38.1
VerifiedObserved Structured OSV record; GitHub-reviewed advisory.
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-j9fc-w3mr-x6mv lists affected ranges: npm @budibase/server >=0 <=3.38.1
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- 8.8 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- EPSS
- CVE-2026-73305: 0.52% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 44.44 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Summary Budibase 3.39.19 (commit 03fbabae4) is affected by a privilege-escalation / missing-authorization flaw in the public role-assignment API. An app-scoped builder (a user who builds only specific apps — user.builder.apps = [appA], not a global builder or admin) can grant themselves builder access to ANY other app in the tenant, or assign themselves/any user an arbitrary data-plane role (e.g. ADMIN) in any app, by calling POST /api/public/v1/roles/assign. The endpoint only authorizes the two global flags (admin, builder); the per-app appBuilder and role:{appId,roleId} grant vectors are passed to the backend without any authorization check that the caller controls the target app. Reproduced in a local authorized lab using the verbatim authorization-gate and SDK logic. This is an incomplete fix of the role-assignment hardening in commit d63d1d9054 ("Inline public user global role validation"), which only ever validated the global flags. Details The issue is caused by authorization…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 2 · amended ·
Amended from ghsa record GHSA-j9fc-w3mr-x6mv
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from osv record GHSA-j9fc-w3mr-x6mv
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-73305 Advisory: Budibase: Privilege escalation via public role assignment API missing app-level authorization IDs: CVE-2026-73305, GHSA-j9fc-w3mr-x6mv Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-73305 (revision 2, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 13:01 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: High (CVSS 8.8) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor response not established. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - npm @budibase/server: affected <= 3.38.1 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - `npm ls @budibase/server --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`. ## Supported action No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on @budibase/server. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-j9fc-w3mr-x6mv (OSV record GHSA-j9fc-w3mr-x6mv lists affected ranges: npm @budibase/server >=0 <=3.38.1) - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-j9fc-w3mr-x6mv (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-j9fc-w3mr-x6mv lists affected ranges: npm @budibase/server >=0 <=3.38.1) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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