Budibase: Email Change IDOR via POST /api/v2/email allows full Account Takeover (accountId not validated against session)
CVE-2026-73303GHSA-c8vc-7pv3-g98p
What to do
Vendor response not established. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check back for a fix.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
npm @budibase/server
- Affected
- <= 3.38.1
- Fixed in
- no fixed version recorded
Sources
- Open Source Vulnerabilities (OSV.dev), including the GitHub Advisory Database
OSV record GHSA-c8vc-7pv3-g98p lists affected ranges: npm @budibase/server >=0 <=3.38.1
VerifiedObserved Structured OSV record; GitHub-reviewed advisory.
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-c8vc-7pv3-g98p lists affected ranges: npm @budibase/server >=0 <=3.38.1
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- not scored
- EPSS
- CVE-2026-73303: 0.31% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 23.70 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Summary POST /api/v2/email on the account portal (account.budibase.app) starts an email-change workflow using a client-supplied accountId that is not validated against the authenticated session. A logged-in attacker supplies a victim's accountId and an email address they control; the verification code is delivered to the attacker's address, and completing the workflow changes the victim's account email. The attacker then password-resets the victim's account through the controlled address and logs in — full account takeover with no victim interaction. Vulnerability Details The endpoint session-checks the currentEmail field (a mismatch returns 403), but it does not enforce body.accountId === session.accountId. The account-portal frontend only ever submits the logged-in user's own accountId, so in normal use the two always match — the server simply trusts the body value. An attacker who has a victim's accountId can point the workflow at the victim's account while passing their own…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 2 · amended ·
Amended from ghsa record GHSA-c8vc-7pv3-g98p
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from osv record GHSA-c8vc-7pv3-g98p
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-73303 Advisory: Budibase: Email Change IDOR via POST /api/v2/email allows full Account Takeover (accountId not validated against session) IDs: CVE-2026-73303, GHSA-c8vc-7pv3-g98p Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-73303 (revision 2, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 13:01 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: Unrated Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor response not established. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - npm @budibase/server: affected <= 3.38.1 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - `npm ls @budibase/server --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`. ## Supported action No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on @budibase/server. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-c8vc-7pv3-g98p (OSV record GHSA-c8vc-7pv3-g98p lists affected ranges: npm @budibase/server >=0 <=3.38.1) - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-c8vc-7pv3-g98p (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-c8vc-7pv3-g98p lists affected ranges: npm @budibase/server >=0 <=3.38.1) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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