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Critical, CVSS 9.0amended

Budibase: OIDC SSO account takeover: incoming identity linked by email without checking email_verified

CVE-2026-73302GHSA-hp6v-6jw7-gv2f

What to do

Vendor response not established. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check back for a fix.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

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Affected packages

  • npm @budibase/server

    Affected
    <= 3.38.1
    Fixed in
    no fixed version recorded

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS 4.0
9.0 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H · score source
EPSS
  • CVE-2026-73302: 0.43% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 37.05 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary Budibase's OIDC SSO login links an incoming SSO identity to an existing Budibase account by email address alone, without ever checking the emailverified claim of the OIDC ID token. Budibase first tries to match the IdP sub; when that misses (any fresh attacker IdP account) it silently falls back to matching by the email claim and merges into the existing account by email, preserving that account's id and roles. Because the emailverified flag is never read, an attacker who can make a configured/trusted IdP emit a token carrying email = <victim with emailverified = false is logged into Budibase as the victim, inheriting the victim's roles (including global admin/builder). Per OIDC Core §5.7 the email claim MUST NOT be used as an identity key unless emailverified is true; Budibase effectively delegates all account-linking trust to every configured IdP's email-verification policy while checking nothing itself. Full account takeover of any existing Budibase user, including the…

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 4 · amended ·

    Amended from ghsa record GHSA-hp6v-6jw7-gv2f

  2. Revision 3 · amended ·

    Reviewed OSV alias/range/CVSS4 correction; package source scopes and original publication preserved. No customer finding resolved.

  3. Revision 2 · amended ·

    Amended from osv record GHSA-hp6v-6jw7-gv2f

  4. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from ghsa record GHSA-hp6v-6jw7-gv2f

Agent brief

Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.

# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-73302

Advisory: Budibase: OIDC SSO account takeover: incoming identity linked by email without checking email_verified
IDs: CVE-2026-73302, GHSA-hp6v-6jw7-gv2f
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-73302 (revision 4, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 13:01 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Critical (CVSS 9.0)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor response not established. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- npm @budibase/server: affected <= 3.38.1

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `npm ls @budibase/server --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`.

## Supported action
No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on @budibase/server.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hp6v-6jw7-gv2f (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-hp6v-6jw7-gv2f lists affected ranges: npm @budibase/server >=0 <=3.38.1)
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-hp6v-6jw7-gv2f (OSV record GHSA-hp6v-6jw7-gv2f lists affected ranges: npm @budibase/server >=0 <=3.38.1)

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