Budibase: DNS rebinding SSRF bypasses remain in OpenAPI import and REST query execution
CVE-2026-72855GHSA-xg5g-26x8-cvf4
What to do
Vendor response not established. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check back for a fix.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
npm @budibase/server
- Affected
- <= 3.38.1
- Fixed in
- no fixed version recorded
Sources
- Open Source Vulnerabilities (OSV.dev), including the GitHub Advisory Database
OSV record GHSA-xg5g-26x8-cvf4 lists affected ranges: npm @budibase/server >=0 <=3.38.1
VerifiedObserved Structured OSV record; GitHub-reviewed advisory.
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-xg5g-26x8-cvf4 lists affected ranges: npm @budibase/server >=0 <=3.38.1
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- 8.5 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
- EPSS
- CVE-2026-72855: 0.38% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 31.51 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Impact A builder-level user can make Budibase issue server-side HTTP requests to loopback or private-network targets by using DNS rebinding against two outbound fetch paths that are still not pinned to the validated DNS answer. The first path is OpenAPI query import. It validates the supplied hostname with the blacklist and then performs a separate raw fetch. A hostname that resolves to a public address during validation and to 127.0.0.1 during the request is accepted. The second path is REST datasource/query execution. It calls the fixed fetchWithBlacklist() helper, but provides a custom undici fetchFn that installs a dispatcher. The helper passes a pinned Node agent, but undici uses the dispatcher and resolves the original hostname again at connection time. This defeats the DNS pinning added for the previous outbound fetch advisory. Impact is authenticated SSRF from the Budibase server process. An attacker with the relevant builder/query privileges can reach loopback or private…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 2 · amended ·
Amended from ghsa record GHSA-xg5g-26x8-cvf4
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from osv record GHSA-xg5g-26x8-cvf4
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-72855 Advisory: Budibase: DNS rebinding SSRF bypasses remain in OpenAPI import and REST query execution IDs: CVE-2026-72855, GHSA-xg5g-26x8-cvf4 Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-72855 (revision 2, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 12:58 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: High (CVSS 8.5) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor response not established. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - npm @budibase/server: affected <= 3.38.1 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - `npm ls @budibase/server --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`. ## Supported action No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on @budibase/server. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-xg5g-26x8-cvf4 (OSV record GHSA-xg5g-26x8-cvf4 lists affected ranges: npm @budibase/server >=0 <=3.38.1) - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xg5g-26x8-cvf4 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-xg5g-26x8-cvf4 lists affected ranges: npm @budibase/server >=0 <=3.38.1) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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