ip-address: a CIDR suffix on the parsed address suppresses special-use classification and can bypass SSRF and trust-boundary checks

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS 4.0

6.9 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N · score source

EPSS

• CVE-2026-69198: 0.48% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 41.47 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary Every special-use classification method is built on isInSubnet, which short-circuits to false whenever the address's own subnet mask is shorter than the reference range's mask. That mask comes verbatim from the CIDR suffix on the parsed input, so appending a suffix such as /0 suppresses classification entirely: isLoopback(), isPrivate(), isLinkLocal(), isCGNAT(), isMulticast(), isUnspecified(), isBroadcast(), isULA(), and getType() all report an internal address as unremarkable, while correctForm() and address still return the real internal target. An application that builds a network trust-boundary decision on these checks (for example a filter intended to block Server-Side Request Forgery, or SSRF) may therefore treat an internal target as external and allow the request. SSRF is an attack in which a user-supplied address coaxes the server into making a request to an internal destination the user could not otherwise reach, such as a loopback service or a cloud metadata…

Published by the source

3 Aug 2026, 19:59 UTC

Last modified by the source

3 Aug 2026, 19:59 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 13:00 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-4xrf-jv44-h6hh

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-69198

Advisory: ip-address: a CIDR suffix on the parsed address suppresses special-use classification and can bypass SSRF and trust-boundary checks
IDs: CVE-2026-69198, GHSA-4xrf-jv44-h6hh
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-69198 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 13:00 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 6.9)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: ip-address 10.2.2. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- npm ip-address: affected >= 10.1.1, <= 10.2.1; fixed in 10.2.2

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `npm ls ip-address --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on ip-address.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4xrf-jv44-h6hh (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-4xrf-jv44-h6hh lists affected ranges: npm ip-address >=10.1.1 <=10.2.1)

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