ip-address: Address4 decodes leading-zero octets as decimal while resolvers decode them as octal, allowing SSRF and trust-boundary bypass

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS 4.0

7.7 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N · score source

EPSS

• CVE-2026-69192: 0.46% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 40.30 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary Address4 accepts an octet written with a leading zero and decodes it as decimal, while the WHATWG URL host parser, inetaton, and getaddrinfo all decode a leading zero as octal. The library and the network stack therefore disagree about which host a string names. new Address4('012.0.0.1') reports correctForm() of 12.0.0.1 and isPrivate() of false, but fetch('http://012.0.0.1/') connects to 10.0.0.1. An application that builds a network trust-boundary decision on these checks (for example a filter intended to block Server-Side Request Forgery, or SSRF) will classify an internal target as external and allow the request. SSRF is an attack in which a user-supplied address coaxes the server into making a request to an internal destination the user could not otherwise reach, such as a loopback service or a cloud metadata endpoint. Details Address4.parse gates untrusted input on READDRESS (src/v4/constants.ts:5), whose per-octet alternative is: The [01]?[0-9][0-9]? branch matches a…

Published by the source

3 Aug 2026, 19:59 UTC

Last modified by the source

3 Aug 2026, 19:59 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 13:00 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-mwp4-54f8-5fhr

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-69192

Advisory: ip-address: Address4 decodes leading-zero octets as decimal while resolvers decode them as octal, allowing SSRF and trust-boundary bypass
IDs: CVE-2026-69192, GHSA-mwp4-54f8-5fhr
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-69192 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 13:00 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 7.7)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: ip-address 10.3.1. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- npm ip-address: affected <= 10.3.0; fixed in 10.3.1

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `npm ls ip-address --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on ip-address.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mwp4-54f8-5fhr (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-mwp4-54f8-5fhr lists affected ranges: npm ip-address >=0 <=10.3.0)

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